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Is social capital long lasting? Does it affect long term economic performance? To answer these questions
we test Putnam's conjecture that today marked differences in social capital between the North and
South of Italy were due to the culture of independence fostered by the free city-states experience in
the North of Italy at the turn of the first millennium. We show that the medieval experience of independence
has an impact on social capital within the North, even when we instrument for the probability of becoming
a city-state with historical factors (such as the Etruscan origin of the city and the presence of a bishop
in year 1,000). More importantly, we show that the difference in social capital among towns that in
the Middle Ages had the characteristics to become independent and towns that did not exists only
in the North (where most of these towns became independent) and not in the South (where the power
of the Norman kingdom prevented them from doing so). Our difference in difference estimates suggest
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In spite of remarkable success stories like the Asian Tigers and, more recently, China, there is a 
very large persistence in economic development. Among European countries, there is a 
correlation of 0.56 between per capita income at the beginning and the end of the century. Even 
between the 1700s and 2000s (over a 300 year-span and with an industrial revolution in the 
middle) the correlation is 0.23.
2  Why are these differences so persistent?   
In an influential paper Acemoglu et al. (2001) attribute this persistence to the long-lasting 
effect of formal institutions. Protection of property rights and limitations on the power of the 
executive, which –  they claim – are essential to the development process, are built into the 
formal institution of a county and tend to persist over the centuries. For instance, in countries 
where settlers’ mortality was very high, colonizers designed institutions aimed at extracting value, 
rather than creating it. In their view, these extractive institutions did not foster (and still do not 
foster) rule of law, thus having a negative effect on development.    
An alternative view is provided by Tabellini (2007), who attributes this persistence to 
culture, measured by indicators of individual values and beliefs, such as trust and respect for 
others. He shows that regions of Europe that had more decentralized decision-making 
responsibilities in the XVII and XVIII centuries, today have both more “progressive values” and 
higher income per capita.  
Both these important papers, however, cannot completely reject the alternative that the 
source of persistence is geographical. Colonies with a lower settler mortality might still bear a 
disadvantage in developing today. Acemoglu et al. (2001) are aware of this problem and argue 
that the diseases that were a problem then (yellow fever and malaria) no longer represent a major 
source of comparative disadvantage. Still other geographical factors impeding economic 
development could be at the origin of this persistence. Similarly, as argued by Aristotle, different 
geographical conditions may foster different institutions and a different set of values. The 
possibility that geography rather than culture explains the persistence found by Tabellini (2007), 
thus, remains alive, especially in light of the fact that the reasons why different institutions 
emerged, remain unclear.    
To try and distinguish between history and geography as a source of persistence we 
revisit Putnam’s (1993) hypothesis.  In “Making Democracy Work”, Putnam conjectures that 
regional differences in trust and social capital within Italy can be traced back to the history of 
independence that certain cities experienced in the first centuries of the second millennium. 
Besides the clear logical link, Putnam’s conjecture has two other advantages. First, it traces back 
the origin of these differences to institutions that are long gone. Hence, it is impossible to 
                                                 
2 These results are obtained using Maddison (2001).   3
attribute any residual difference in social capital (and difference in economic outcomes associated 
with it) to the survival of any formal institution. Second, while concentrated in the Center North 
part of the country, the free-city state experience did not involve all the major cities in the Center 
North. It is possible, then, to look within the Center North  to determine whether cities that 
experienced a period of independence as free city-states have today (more than 800 years later) a 
different level of social capital.  
To test Putnam’s conjecture we start by comparing current levels of social capital within 
the North-central part of Italy. Following Putnam’s (1993) measures of social capital, we use the 
number of non-profit organizations per capita, turnout at major referenda, and the  presence of an  
organ donation organization.            
Consider for example the difference between Faenza, a town of 54,000 inhabitants, 30 
miles South-East of Bologna and Senigallia, a town of 44,000 inhabitants  60 miles South of 
Faenza. They were both important medieval towns, in fact Senigallia used to hold one of the 
largest fairs in Italy, visited by merchants from all over Europe and especially the Levant. Faenza 
became a free city while Senigallia, which belonged to the March of Ancona and as such had a 
strong presence of imperial power, never did (at the end of the twelfth century was the seat of a 
count). Following all three measures of social capital, Faenza dominates Senigallia: the number 
of non-profit organizations per capita is 42% higher, participation at referenda is 89% versus 86%, 
and Faenza has an organ donation organization, while Senigallia does not.            
To conduct this analysis in a more systematic way, we identify the largest 400 Italian 
towns in the Center-North in 1871 (the first Census after Italian unification) and for these we 
reconstruct their medieval history as well as collect several measures of social capital. We, then, 
relate today’s social capital levels to determine whether a town had been a free city-state in the 
1000-1300 period.  
Consistent with Putnam’s conjecture, we find that Center-Northern cities that 
experienced a period of independence as a free city have significantly higher levels of social 
capital today. For example, the number of voluntary associations is 25% higher in cities that were 
free city-states.     
While general geographical conditions within the Center-North are similar, this test alone 
cannot reject the hypothesis that some more subtle geographical characteristics, such as closeness 
to the sea, affect both social capital and the probability that a city would become a free-city-state. 
In our regressions we control for several morphological characteristics, nevertheless we address 
this problem directly by digging into history to find some exogenous determinants of the rise of 
independent municipalities.    4
Our reading of Medieval history books (among others, Reynolds, 1997; Milani, 2005; 
Jones, 1997; Tabacco, 1987; Pirenne, 1956) suggests that a key factor in the formation of free 
cities was the coordination role played by a local religious authority. Therefore, as a predictor of 
becoming a free city-states, we use whether a town was the seat of a bishop before the year 1000. 
A second potential predictor of achieving independence is the strategic military position. A city 
like Orvieto, which is located on top of a cliff, was much easier to defend militarily (especially 
before the introduction of gunpowder), than a city in the middle of a plain. Since this advantage is 
not easy to identify directly, we use earlier history to help us determine it. The earliest civilization 
that was organized as free city-states is Etruscan (IX century B.C), which populated an area from 
Mantua in the North to Salerno in the South. Since the Etruscans had the first mover advantage, 
they chose to locate their cities in positions that were easy to defend. Hence, we use the Etruscan 
origin of a city as a predictor of becoming a free city-state in the Middle Ages.   
Both these instruments have a strong predictive power on the likelihood of being a free 
city-state. The F-test of the exclusion restriction is 66, so we do not suffer from a weak 
instrument problem. Even when we instrument the existence of a free city-state with its historical 
determinants, we find that free city-state towns have more social capital today.  
  These results are supportive of Putnam’s conjecture, but are not a definite rejection of the 
geographical alternative. It is possible that something in the morphology of the territory (not 
captured by our controls) drives all our results. If there is a location advantage that has lead the 
Etruscans to settle there, has lead the Catholic Church to elect it as a seat of its bishops, has made 
it easier for that city to conquer independence from the Emperor, and also fosters social capital 
today,  then our instruments do not solve the problem.  
To address this issue, we use a difference in difference approach, exploiting a historical 
counterfactual. If cities in Southern Italy did not become free city-states, it is not because they 
were poorer or had less opportunities to trade (in fact at the beginning of the second millennium 
the South of Italy was more developed and prosperous than the North) but because of the strong 
central power exerted by the Normans (Putnam, 1993). Under the maintained hypothesis that the 
determinants of location advantages are the same in the Center North and in the South, we can 
predict which towns would have become free city-states in the South had the Normans not been 
there. We then compare the difference in social capital between the towns predicted to become 
free city-states in the Center North (where they did become) and predicted to become free city-
states in the South (where they did not). We use the difference in social capital between towns not 
predicted to become free city-states in the Center North and in the South as a control for generic 
differences between North and South. When we do so, we find that there is much less social   5
capital in the South regardless (an effect that could be either driven by history, as suggested by 
Putnam, or geography). The difference between free city-states and not within each macro-region, 
however, is present only in the North. For example, Northern free city-states have 17% more non-
profit associations than similar Northern towns that were not free city-states. 
Our difference in difference estimates suggest that at least half of the gap in social capital 
between the North and the South of Italy can be attributed to the free city-state experience. But 
our approach clearly underestimates the impact of political independence on social capital 
because it ignores local spillover effects. We cannot exclude, however, that other historical and/or 
geographical variables are responsible for the remaining half of the gap.    
Interestingly, in the South, current levels of social capital do not differ between towns 
that we predicted to become free city-states and towns that are not.  This lack of an effect in the 
difference in the South can be regarded as a test of the validity of our instruments. Besides being 
correlated with the variable of interest (a hypothesis easily checked), an instrument should be 
orthogonal to the error. This assumption is generally not testable, because normally we do not 
have access to a counterfactual sample. The Italian historical experience, however, allows this 
counterfactual. Up until the fall of the Roman Empire, the North center and the Southern regions 
of Italy experienced a similar history. The affirmation of the Norman Kingdom in the South, 
however, prevented the formation of free city-states in the South. We can then test whether our 
instruments (being the seat of a bishop and Etruscan city) have an effect only on the probability 
of becoming a free city-state, but not on social capital directly, by looking at their effect in the 
South, where free city-states did not occur. That these instruments have no effect in the South 
suggests the exclusion restriction is valid. 
Having established the validity of our instruments for social capital, we can use them to 
estimate the impact of social capital on economic development. When we do so, we find that one 
standard deviation increase in social capital increases per capita income by 21%. This estimate 
vindicates Arrow’s (1972) statement that much of economic backwardness is due to lack of trust 
and social capital.  
Our results raise the question of how a relatively brief historical experience can leave 
such a long-lasting (more than 500 years) trace. We address this question in a separate work 
(GSZ, 2008), where we model the intergenerational transmission of beliefs. In that paper we 
show that even a brief positive experience of cooperation (2-3 generations) can have lasting 
effects on the beliefs (and hence of the social capital) of a community, even without the survival 
of any legal institutions.    6
  The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides a brief primer on medieval 
Italian history that illustrates the logical connection between the acquisition of political 
independence and the development of social capital. Section 2 describes our data. Section 3 
presents the analysis of the effect of the free city-state experience within the North center part of 
Italy. Section 4 presents the difference in difference regression and discusses the validity of the 




1. A primer in Italian medieval history 
1.1 Social capital and the free city-state experience 
The term social capital has been used to indicate several, often very different, concepts. We 
follow Putnam (1993) and identify social capital with civicness or “the collection of good 
behavior that tends to be simultaneously present in certain communities/countries whose 
inhabitants vote, obey the law, and cooperate with each other and whose leaders are honest and 
committed to the public good” (Putnam, 1995). 
  It is unclear in the literature how this social capital is formed and transmitted over time. 
Putnam (2000) and Costa and Kahan (2003) emphasize the role free associations play in fostering 
it. We follow Putnam (1993) who conjectures that the provision of public goods requires some 
degree of cooperation. Communities differ in their return to cooperation and in their ability to 
foster it. Once a certain degree of cooperation is established, however, people observe the 
benefits of this cooperation and tend to develop a culture (norms and beliefs) that sustains it (for 
ways to model this, see Tabellini (2008) and GSZ (2008)).   
  As we will describe below, the Italian free city-state experience is a wonderful, natural 
experiment, where at a certain point in history the return to cooperation rose dramatically only in 
a certain part of the country. As we will explain, some accidental factors (the presence of a 
religious authority, the strategic location, distance from the imperial army) determined why some 
towns achieved successful cooperation in defending themselves and organizing their political 
activity, while others did not. In the rest of this section we will try to describe how this process 
took place.  
 
1.2 The rise of the free city-states     
   7
The rise of city-states in Northern-Central Italy is part of a broader process triggered by the 
collapse of the Carolingian Holy Roman Empire at the end of the first millennium. The central 
feature is the affirmation of self-government in cities. While spread over Northern Central and  
Western Europe (Reynolds, 1997; McKitterick, 2004) this development was particularly strong in 
Northern-Central Italy between 1100 and 1300 because of the weakness of any central authority 
in this part of Europe and the strong benefits arising from trade. The vacuum created by the 
weakening of the imperial authority lead to the emergence of local powers.  
At the beginning, in some cities, the response to the lack of government was the 
formation of small groups of individuals who agreed with a “patto giurato” (literally a swore 
pact) to provide mutual help and collaborate to solve problems of common interest. An example 
is the Genovese compagna, an alliance among the most prominent families of the marine 
aristocracy who swore to collaborate to solve problems of common interest.  
Enforcement of the pact was achieved by a threat of exclusion, exclusion from trade and 
political relations with the other members of the pact.  This was a very costly punishment for 
people heavily engaged in trade at a time when commerce was booming. In some cities (e.g. Pisa), 
a third party – the city bishop – was assigned the role of guarantor of the pact. His presence added 
another punishment for defection: the exclusion from the sacrament and in particular from the 
weekly communion.  In sum, the pacts were enforced by a combination of economic, political, 
and religious ostracism.  
Slowly, more stable institutions started to emerge. The first seed of the free city is the 
consulate – a committee of a limited number of citizens, endowed with significant power that 
remained in office for a specified period of time (initially one year).  Reliance on the counsels for 
the administration of the city marks the most visible sign of the rise of the free city as an 
independent political body (Milani, 2005, p. 23). With time, effort and wars, the free city 
developed fully. Over the course of the next two centuries the small assembly of the heads of the 
main families that were sharing powers (the participants to the pact) evolved into a formal 
“parliament” of elected members that allowed for a wider participation of the population in the 
decision making process.
3 With these changes, the independent city-state was fully developed. It 
                                                 
3 The juxtaposition of two episodes – as described in Milani (2005) in which Faenza – a town near Bologna 
– faced a military threat two hundred years apart gives a sense of how powers shifted and how the new 
institutions consolidated during this period.  In the fall of 1079, Faenza receives a declaration of war from 
the neighboring city of Ravenna. The disproportion in relative powers is huge. Faenza can gather at most 
150 soldiers. In an attempt to prepare a defense, the main families, which have agreed to cooperate to 
govern the city, send a few representatives in search for help all over the Po river plain. After an 
unsuccessful start, they find a French knight - the Count of Vitry – who is willing to help them with his 
own army in exchange for perpetual submission. When the Faentines’ representatives return to town, they   8
provided law and order, collected duties and tolls, took care of the walls that provided the basic 
protection to the citizens and was responsible for the maintenance and security of the roads, 
essential to guarantee trade, which was developing fast. 
   In the mid-twelfth century a new word came into use to describe the independent town 
communities and their government: “commune”. As Reynolds (1997) notices “… its use in urban 
context may derive from communia, meaning common property: not only walls and streets but 
also cathedrals and churches were increasingly regarded as the responsibility and therefore the 
property of the local community. Their rights and liberties were also their common property 
which it was their responsibility to maintain (p. 170)”. Indeed, the word commune is a synonym 
for republic (res publica, i.e. common property) and is used with this meaning.  This sense of 
responsibility for the common good that citizens of independent towns developed and 
consolidated over two centuries of self-government is the “civicness” Putnam refers to.    
The extraordinary independence enjoyed by Italian free cities did not come for free. They 
had to defend it from the attempts of German Emperors to exercise their authority and impose 
taxes; from the pretences of local lords; and from the repeated attempts of other free cities to 
expand their domains.  
The battle for independence from the Emperor reached its peak in 1176 when a league of 
free cities in the North of Italy, the Lombard League, defeated Emperor Fredrick I Barbarossa 
who descended on Italy to try to reaffirm his powers and privileges. On that occasion not all the 
free cities fought the Emperor, some sided with him in exchange for concessions. That free cities 
were able to strike deals with the Emperor, however, shows how powerful local governments had 
become.  
   To appreciate how different an institution free cities were and how deeply they changed 
the political culture of the time, several aspects are worth emphasizing. First, in the commune the 
political entity is not identified with a single person ruling, but with the entire community 
(henceforth the name). Second, the source of political power and legitimacy of authority is not 
religious or dynastic, but comes from the people. Rules, laws, and formal decisions are always 
                                                                                                                                                 
announce the proposed solution to the main household heads gathered in the small cloister of the cathedral. 
The solution offered reveals to be a successful one, as the Count of Vitry is able not only to defeat the 
Ravenna troops but, generously, frees the Faentines from their promise of submission.  Two centuries later, 
in the Fall of 1275, Faenza is threatened by another free city: Bologna. Faenza is the local headquarters of 
Ghibellin troops in the region and is under attack from the surrounding Guelph cities. The Emperor’s 
ambassador is received by all the city knights (now in the order of thousands) and introduced to the 
assembly of all the city household heads, meeting in the large city square (piazza), built for these occasions.  
After that, Faenza calls a general city council, whose members are elected by all citizens to have the 
proposal approved (see Milani, 2005 p. V). Compared to two centuries earlier, the town now has its formal 
political institutions and is able to negotiate as equal with the most important political authorities of the 
time (the Emperor and the Pope).   9
made in the name of the people, though in practice elites and families are very important. Third, 
communal life is regulated by statutes enacted by the assembly which apply to all citizens rather 
than to a group of subjects (Galizia, 1951 and Tabacco, 1987). This is in sharp contrast with the 
feudal society where rules and rights differ on the basis of the status of a person (noble, peasant, 
clergymen, etc.). Finally, the development of the commune goes hand-in-hand with that of 
personal freedoms: before the rise of the independent cities, townsmen were subservient to the 
local lord. With the commune, personal freedoms receive legal protection against abuses of 
government officials, whose actions are subject to control of ad hoc institutions, including courts 
of law to which citizens could appeal (Galizia, 1951).  
In other words, the free city-states developed a system of protection of property rights 
and limits to the power of the executive that Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) deem necessary for 
development.  
  
1.3. From the Commune to the Signoria: evolution and dissolution of the free city-states 
Over the course of the thirteen and fourteen centuries, the increase in social mobility associated 
with the sustained economic growth lead to the emergence of new, rich and powerful merchants, 
who claimed political power and threatened the city’s political equilibrium, dominated by the 
older powerful families. At the same time intense competition from neighboring cities threaten 
their independence.   
Initially the problem was addressed by inviting a third party, possibly a foreigner, called 
“Podesta’ forestiero” – a foreign city mayor – to manage the city for a specified length of time. 
This institution slowly evolved towards one where the “podesta’” acquired more power and 
retained it for longer periods, ultimately forever.  
As free cities started to confer life-long power into the hands of a single person – the 
Lord or Signore, communes became Signoria (lordly power). Interestingly, however, in several 
cases the Signoria retained the basic institutions of the commune including the principle that 
power originated from the people and was exercised in the people’s name. In some cities, as in 
Florence and Genoa, the Signoria also preserved the political institutions and the personal 
freedoms present during the commune period. In this sense the Signoria is a continuation and 
transformation of the commune (as argued by Prezzolini, 1948 and Chittolini, 1999), which might 
have allowed the civic culture to root more deeply, especially with respect to other cities, which 
were conquered and subjected by neighboring towns or foreign powers.  
 
1.4 The lasting legacy of communes    10
Having explained how the formation of communes was logically linked to the 
development of social capital, we now test Putnam’s conjecture that these differences in the level 
of social capital survived to the current day. Clearly, this is no small step. We will return to the 
mechanisms through which differences in social capital might have persisted in the conclusions 
and we develop these arguments further in a companion paper (GSZ, 2008).  
 
1.4. Why some towns acquire independence and others do not? 
Before moving to the tests, however, we need to explain why communes (and thus the 
civic spirit) did not diffuse homogeneously throughout the Italian territory. Paradoxically, the 
reason why Southern Italy did not experience communes is because they did not need communes: 
law and order was insured by the highly autocratic and efficient Norman kingdom (Putnam 
(1993) and Kantorowicz (1931)). Between 1061 and 1091 the Normans invaded the part of the 
country south of Rome and formed a feudal monarchy, which continued in some forms or another 
until the Italian unification in 1861. 
The Norman kingdom brought peace and prosperity to the South. By the end of the 12
th 
century Sicily was the richest, most advanced State in Europe. But its highly hierarchical form of 
government inhibited the formation of independent city-states and, in doing so, they prevented 
the accumulation of social capital (Putnam, 1993).  
The same reason – a strong local power – explains why in certain areas of the North and 
the Center communes were rare or non-existent. This happened, for instance, in the marches – the 
regions along the empire’s eastern frontier (for example today the regions of Marche and Friuli) - 
that Charlemagne endowed with stronger military and political power to better serve their 
defensive role when in year 800 he reorganized the empire. The town of Senigallia, mentioned in 
the introduction, is an example of this. Trieste, a relatively important town in the most Eastern 
part of the country, is another.  
There are three other factors (linked to the costs and benefits of achieving independence) 
that explain the heterogeneity in the Center-North.  First, not all towns had the same need to 
secure law and order at the time when the Holy Roman Empire was losing its grip. The need for 
security was greater where the opportunities for commerce were greater. Since commerce took 
place by sea or along the old Roman road, in our empirical analysis we are going to capture this 
effect with the location of a town along the coast and at a crossroad of two Roman roads.  
Given a certain need for a local political power, the ability to solve the coordination 
problem and provide security was helped by the local presence of a religious authority, such as a 
bishop or archbishop. This religious authority made it easier to enforce the “patti giurati”, which   11
formed the first nucleus of communes (Tabacco, 1987). Empirically, we can measure this with a 
dummy variable equal to one if the town was the seat of a bishop by the year 1000.  
Finally, the opportunity to insure the survival of an independent source of power was 
greatly enhanced by strategic considerations. A town like Orvieto, which is located on top of a 
cliff (see Figure 3), can more easily defend its autonomy (especially before the introduction of 
gunpowder), than a city in the middle of a plain. Since this advantage is not easily identified 
directly, we use earlier history to help us determine it. The earliest civilization that was organized 
as free city-states is Etruscan (IX century B.C), which populated an area from Mantua in the 
North to Salerno in the South. Since the Etruscans had the first mover advantage, they chose to 
locate their cities in positions that were easy to defend (not coincidentally, Orvieto was the capital 
of the Etruscan confederation). Hence, we use the Etruscan origin of a town as a predictor of its 
ability to become a commune after year 1000 C.E.    
 
2. Data 
2.1 Sample selection      
To reduce the cost of collecting historical data at the town level, we had to limit the size of the 
sample to a manageable number of towns. To minimize possible survivorship biases we selected 
the largest 400 cities (by population) in the area that was under the Holy Roman Empire at the 
beginning of the second Millennium (see Figure 1). We selected  the earliest day we have Census 
data for (i.e., right after Italian unification in 1861). At current borders this area comprises 12 
regions: Piedmont, Valle D’Aosta, Liguria, Lombardy, Trentino, Veneto, Friuli, Emilia, Tuscany, 
Umbria, Marche and Latium.
4 Since Sardinia was not part of the Holy Roman Empire nor was it 
under the Normans, we have excluded it from the sample altogether. We also dropped Rome 
since its history is too peculiar and unique. 
To run the difference in difference estimates we selected a sample of cities in the south of 
Italy by using the same criteria. Using today’s borders this area includes 7 regions: Campania, 
Abruzzi, Molise, Basilicata, Calabria, Puglia, and Sicilia. When we use the 1871 population 
cutoff that delivered 400 cities in the Center North (6,619 inhabitants), in the South we obtain a 
sample of 286 towns.        
 
                                                 
4 The 1871 census does not contain data for Trentino and Friuli (which at the time were still under the 
Austrian empire). For these areas we use the used the 1921 census (the first after World War I when they 
were liberated) and deflated their 1921 population by the average population growth in the other Center 
North regions during the same period.      12
2.2 Identifying communes 
Historians seem to agree that a commune, to be properly identified as such, should fulfill 
at least four criteria. First, it should have consuls as part of its institutions. Second, it should have 
its own institutions to administer justice. Third, it should have some military power and military 
activity. Finally, it should have its own territory (the contado) to administer (Milani, 2005). 
Assessing the presence of these criteria in all the 400 cities in our sample, however, is extremely 
difficult and bound to errors, since a comprehensive history of communes in Italy does not exist.   
We chose instead to start from the most prominent historical atlas (the De Agostini 
Historical Atlas) and checked that all the towns reported as independent in the atlas fit the four 
criteria above. This method tends to underestimate the number of free cities, biased against 
finding any effect of communes.  
Since the status of independence changes over time, we chose to focus at two moments in 
time. The first one, 1176, is when the Northern communes organized into a league (the Lombard 
League) to fight against the Emperor Frederick I, also known as “Barbarossa”. We then checked 
our results using the list of independent cities in year 1300, when the free city-state movement 
was at the top of its expansion and before the emergence of the Signoria.  
  Figure 1 shows the map of communal Italy in 1176. The red line marks the border of the 
Kingdom of Italy under the Holy Roman Empire. The independent cities are those marked with a 
black dot. The map also distinguishes which cities joined the Lombard League (labeled in red) in 
the war for independence against the Emperor and which were allied to the Emperor (labeled in 
blue). Finally, the map shows several cities that while important at the time, were not communes. 
As we can see, communes were spread all over Central-North Italy, but the phenomenon was 
more intense in certain regions (such a Tuscany and Emilia) than in others (such as Latium or 
Marche). One controversial case is Venice. While clearly independent, Venice is not classified as 
a commune because it was an oligarchy, with a different set of institutions. To be consistent with 
our source, we labeled Venice as a “non free city-state”, but our results are robust to treating 
Venice as a commune.     
Table 1 lists all the cities in our sample. The first column (after the names) reports 
whether the town was a commune in 1176 as per Figure 1. Overall, there are 67 communes. We 
lose five of them (Albenga, Cervia, Chiusi, Gravedona and Noli) because they did not make our 
cutoff for inhabitants as of 1871 and one (Bellinzona) because it is not part of Italy today. 
Therefore, the final sample includes 61 free cities (15% of the sample).     13
The second column reports whether the town was a commune in 1300 as per Figure 2. 
This criterion leads to 58 free cities: 45 were also present in the first list, while 13 are new. As a 
third definition, we use the union of the two criteria; which delivers 71 free cities (18%). 
For these communes, we constructed a measure of length of independence by consulting 
several historical sources (see Appendix). The most controversial date is the beginning of the 
independence period. First, this process was gradual, from the formation of the “patto giurato” to 
the election of the first consuls, to end with the adoption of the first statute (a sort of constitution). 
Second, in Italy, towns are very proud of their heritage and they tend to boast about the beginning 
of their independence. It is generally easier to determine when the independence ended, because 
this corresponds to a major military defeat or invasion or the transformation of the commune into 
a  Signoria. Finally, using the same sources we constructed an indicator for whether the 
independent city evolved into a Signoria. See the data appendix for more details.  
 
2.3. Social capital measures   
As main indicators of social capital, Putnam (1993) uses the presence of non-profit associations 
and the electoral turnout in major referenda.
5 We follow suit and as a first measure of social 
capital we compute the total number of non-profit associations present in a town in 2000. Since 
this information comes from the 2001 census, it has the great advantage of counting all non-profit 
organizations no matter their scope.
6  Another advantage of this measure is that it is readily 
available for all the municipalities, including those in the South of Italy, which will become 
useful in our difference in difference exercise in Section 5. 
As a second measure of social capital, we use referenda turnout. Since these data are 
(surprisingly) not available at the town level in electronic format and difficult to reach even in 
paper format, we limit ourselves to three major referenda (see appendix).  
  Finally, we would like to integrate these measures with a measure of blood donations, as 
we did in GSZ (2004). Unfortunately, using blood donations at the town level has some problems. 
First, in some regions (e.g. Tuscany) there are several voluntary organizations of blood donors, 
which do not keep the same quality records as AVIS, the major one. Their activity is negligible at 
the provincial level, but not at the town level, particularly in smaller towns where they compete 
with AVIS. Second, people might donate blood where they work and not necessarily where they 
live, clouding the measure at the town level. For these reasons we have replaced this measure 
                                                 
5 He chooses referenda over political election for fear of contamination of the so called “exchange vote”, 
people who are paid to vote for a particular candidate in political elections.  
6 This feature is particularly important in smaller towns where, given fixes set up costs, only certain types 
of organization might be present.       14
with an indicator of the existence in the town of an organ donation association. This measure has 
the same desirable feature of the blood donations measure (i.e., it cannot be explained by 
economic motives) but it is less subject to errors, since there is only one organ donation 
association (AIDO). The data appendix provides additional details on how these variables are 
constructed and their sources.     
         
2.4 Other historical variables and city controls 
We have also gathered a number of additional historical variables that we use as controls or 
instruments in our regressions. First, we are able to determine which towns were the seat of a 
bishop at the time of formation of the independent city-states. In our Center-North sample we find 
86 such towns. Bishop seats were mostly formed around the III and IV centuries AD, following 
the diffusions of the Christianity in the Roman Empire. As a result, 85 percent of these seat 
locations predate year 1,000.  
Second, we obtained information on the Etruscan origin of a town from Antonello 
Montesanti, an archeologist expert on the topic. Moving from  Etruria – the region corresponding 
approximately to Tuscany, Umbria and Northern Lazio – Etruscans founded two additional city 
clusters of towns, one north of Tuscany in Romagna, and one in Campania, South of Lazio. Since 
Etruscans believed that the number 12 had magical power, these clusters included 12 cities each. 
23 out of the 24 Etruscan towns in the Center North can be mapped into current towns, while we 
can do the same for only 8 of the 12 in the South.   
Another factor behind the achievement of independence is the size of a town. To this 
purpose we use data from Bairoch et al. (1988). Since data on population for the year 1,000 is 
very scarce,  we use data for 1,300 - the first year data become available for a relatively large 
number of towns. By contrast, to determine whether a town was located at a crossroad of Roman 
roads we use the Touring Club Historical Atlas.  
Finally, all the other variables (including geographic controls and data on per capita 
income and wealth) are from “Le Misure dei Comuni”, 2003-2004 edition, a database assembled 
by the association of municipal administrations, which reports over 320 variables at the city level. 
The data appendix provides more details about the definition and sources of the variables. Table 2 
shows summary statistics.     
 
 
3. The analysis within the Center-North      15
   
3.1 The weighted least square estimates  
We start by analyzing the variation in social capital within the Center-North. Since the measures 
of social capital we use tend to be noisier for smaller towns, we weight the residuals by 
population in 2001.  
The first measure of social capital we use is the number of non-profit organizations 
divided by population in 2001 (Table 3, Panel A). In column 1 we regress this measure on a 
simple indicator of whether a town was a free city in 1176. Consistent with Putnam (1993), 
having had a commune is related to 0.42 more associations per capita, which corresponds to a 8% 
increase in the average level of per capita association. This effect, however, is not statistically 
significant.  
This regression does not control for any geographical difference nor for any variation in 
population. Morphological characteristics might affect the cost of interaction and so the level of 
social capital. At the same time, they might have affected the probability of becoming 
independent, by influencing the ability to defend the city, hence generating a possible spurious 
correlation or hiding an existing one.  
To address these concerns, in column 2 we insert several controls. To control for whether 
a town is located in the mountains, we insert the average elevation (in thousand meters) of the 
city, measured at the location of Town Hall. To control for geographically-driven differences in 
the cost of interaction we insert the maximum elevation difference within the city territory. We 
also control for whether a town is along the coast or within five kilometers from the sea. As a 
measure of the trade opportunities, we insert a dummy, whether a town is located at the crossroad 
of two or more Roman roads.  Finally, as a measure of size, we control for the number of 
inhabitants (thousands of people) in 2001. Since we are unsure on how population affects social 
capital, we insert both the level of population and its square.   
Towns with steeper territories tend to have higher levels of social capital, while towns 
located on the coast, lower levels. Towns at the center of commerce do not exhibit higher level of 
social capital, while bigger towns have lower levels of social capital. After all these geographical 
controls are inserted, the impact of the free city-state experience is almost three times as large and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Towns that have been a commune have 1.1 more 
associations per thousands inhabitants, equal to 21% more. This is only half of the difference in 
social capital between Center North and South, but it is estimated using only the within Center 
North variation.    16
Another known determinant of social capital (Alesina and La Ferrara (2002)) is the level 
of income inequality.  For this reason, in column 3 we insert two Gini measures of inequality: in 
land ownership and in pre-taxed income. This addition runs the risk of overcontrolling, since 
income inequality could be an effect of persistent lower levels of social capital. Surprisingly, 
higher income inequality leads to more social capital, as measured by the number of non-profit 
associations per capita. This effect, however, is due to the lack of a control for income per capita. 
When we will introduce this control (see column 6) this effect will disappear. Regardless, the 
impact of having been a commune remains unchanged.  
While we control for population and population square, it is still possible that our 
estimated effect only reflects some non-linearity between city size and social capital. For this 
reason, in column 4 we drop all towns with more than 120,000 inhabitants in 2001. The effect of 
the free city-state experience remains unchanged.   
Two thirds of Medieval free city-states coincide with today’s provincial capitals. This 
administrative role might confer a different status to the city, which might affect its level of social 
capital. For example, associations might find it convenient to be located in the provincial capital 
because of proximity to the local administration. For this reason, in column 5 we drop all 
provincial capitals from the regression. The effect of the commune experience is larger than 
before.    
Glaeser et al (2002) show that individual investments in social interaction increases with 
per capita income. Since towns that became independent in the Middle Ages were likely to be 
richer, the free city-state experience might be a proxy for some unobserved characteristics that 
make a certain town more prosperous.
7  To address this concern we would like to insert the 1100 
level of income per capita. Unfortunately, we do not have any such measure and we have to resort 
to today’s level of income per capita. This specification will clearly underestimate the impact of 
the free city-state experience, because, as Knack and Keefer (1996) show, social capital promotes 
growth and so the higher social capital generated by the city-state experience will translate into 
higher per capita income. As column 6 shows, richer towns do exhibit a higher level of social 
capital and, as expected, the insertion of this variable does reduce the impact of the free city-state 
experience on today’s level of social capital. The effect of the communal experience, however, is 
still positive and economically and statistically significant.      
                                                 
7 Of course the fact that very rich towns in the South, even richer than Northern towns, such as Salerno and 
Palermo, did not become free cities suggests that historical accident more than unobserved prosperity was 
driving the acquisition of independence.     17
 Finally, in column 7 we add to the basic specification (column 3) four area dummies to 
capture possible unobserved heterogeneity in the social capital across these regions (North East, 
North West, Center North, and Center) due to other historical factors. These dummies (not 
reported) are all statistically significant, but inserting them does not change the impact of the free 
city-state experience on social capital.  
Since the number of non-profit organizations is available electronically for all Italian 
towns, when we use this measure we can check whether our results hold in the entire sample of  
5,360 towns in the Center-North (Table 3b).
8 When we do so, the estimates of the free city-state 
experience is approximately twice as large as that estimated by using the smaller sample. This is 
not surprising as smaller towns were less likely to have been a commune. Hence, our focus on the 
largest 400 towns, if anything, provides a lower bound of the true effect of past history on social 
capital.            
  In Table 4 we estimate the same regressions by using as a measure of social capital the 
referenda turnout (percentage of people voting at the referenda). Interestingly, when we do not 
control for city size (column 1) the impact of the free city-state experience on social capital is 
negative though not statistically significant. When we insert such a control, however, the 
coefficient turns positive and statistically significant (column 3). In cities that experienced a 
commune, electoral participation is on average one percentage point higher (corresponding to an 
increase equal to 20% of the standard deviation in the sample). All the other specifications 
confirm this result, except when we exclude the larger towns and the provincial capitals. When 
we do so, the effect of the free city-state experience becomes smaller and not statistically 
significant.  
 Finally, in Table 5 we repeat the exercise by using our third measure of social capital: 
the presence of an organ donation association. As in the case of electoral participation the effect 
of the free city-state experience is positive and statistically significant in all the specifications 
except when we exclude the larger towns and the provincial capitals.  This result is hardly 
surprising. Not only when we eliminate the provincial capitals are we eliminating two thirds of 
the free city-states, we are also eliminating one of the channels through which this effect works. 
Towns that became independent in the Middle Ages and have accumulated more social capital are 
likely to prosper more and, as a result, to be chosen as a provincial capital.    
As a robustness test, in Table 6, Panel A, for each measure of social capital we report the 
main specification (column 3) estimated by Ordinary Least Squares, rather than Weighted Least 
                                                 
8 In this specification we omit variable “location at an intersection of two Roman roads, since we have 
collected it only for the 400 largest towns.    18
Squares. The results are substantially the same, with the only exception that the free city-state 
experience is not statistically significant when we measure social capital as referenda turnout. 
This is not surprising, since in smaller towns idiosyncratic issues might increase the noisiness of 
the left-hand-side variable, which reduces the statistical significance.  
In Table 6, Panel B we check the robustness of the result to the definition of the set of 
free cities; the first three columns rely on the historical map of Italy as of 1300  to identify which 
towns had been communes, while columns 6-8 use the union of the two definitions. In either case 
results are similar to the ones obtained using the first definition, except that the estimated effect 
on referenda turnout is lower when we use the 1300 map as the basis for classification of 
independent cities.  
 
3.2 Digging more into history   
  Thus far, we have treated all the free city-state experiences the same. This is clearly 
wrong. First, the length of independence was very different. Second, the history after the end of 
the free city-state experience was different: some towns became dominated by neighboring towns, 
others experienced the transformation of the Commune into a Signoria. Finally, the quality of the 
free city-state institutions and their degree of autonomy was very different. In this section we 
explore whether these differences had an impact on the culture each city elaborated and (through 
it) in today’s social capital.   
  Table 7 starts by analyzing the effect of the length of independence (Panel A). As we 
discussed earlier, this measure is very noisy, since the exact date when independence started as 
well as when it ended is somewhat subjective. Since many of the factors that determined the 
formation of the free city-states also determine the length of independence, to identify the effect 
of the latter we use a Heckman two steps estimator. As we will discuss in section 3.3, there are 
several variables that help predict why some cities have become independent. Except for being a 
bishop seat, all these variables are likely to affect the length of independence too. Therefore, our 
identifying restriction is that the local presence of a bishop contributed in overcoming the initial 
coordination problem, but did not affect a city’s ability to remain independent.  
The first column shows the results of the estimates for the number of non-profit 
organizations. The length of independence has a positive effect on this measure of social capital 
and the estimate is statistically significant. Economically, however, the effect is small: starting 
with a length of independence of 206 years (the sample mean) and increasing it by one standard 
deviation (about 100 years) raises the number of non-profit organizations by 2.5% of the average 
among the cities that have experienced independence. If one started at a lower length (50 years,   19
around the first percentile) effects would be four times larger but still contained. Given that this 
measure is quite noisy, it is quite possible that our estimates are biased downwards and they are a 
lower bound of the true effect.  
The second column shows that when social capital is measured with referenda turnout we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that differences in the length of independence among free cities has 
no impact, possibly reflecting both the noise in this measure of social capital and the attenuation 
bias induced by the measurement error in the length on independence.  
The length of independence helps also predict the existence of an organ donation 
organization in the city. Even if the estimated coefficient is statistically significant, economically 
the effect is small: at the sample mean a 100 year increase in the length of independence raises 
the probability of having an organ donation organization by only 4 percentage points (which is 
10 % of the sample mean).           
  In Panel B we study the effect of having a period as a Signoria after being a commune. 
Free city-states that did not evolve into a Signoria generally lost their independence to another 
commune  or  Signoria. This latter outcome implied a demolition of the local communal 
institutions and the abolition of many of the rights associated with that. Therefore, we expect that 
communes that did not evolve  into a Signoria exhibit a lower persistence of social capital.  
As column 1 shows, experiencing a period of Signoria adds to the level of social capital. 
Signoria towns have 0.7 more associations per thousand inhabitants than towns that were just free 
city-states (almost doubling the effect of having been a free city-state). The same is true if we 
measure social capital as electoral participation (column 2) or organ donation (column 3).  
  In Panel C we analyze the effect of the degree of independence. As a proxy for this 
difficult-to-measure variable we use the side different cities took in the struggle against Emperor 
Frederick I in the middle of the 12
th century. In 1158 Frederick claimed direct Imperial control 
over Italy. Twenty-four cities in the North formed an alliance (called the Lombard League)
 to 
counter Frederick’s attempt to assert his influence over Italy. We take active participation in this 
League as an indicator of the strength of the independence of these towns. This is especially true 
if we contrast these cities with other free city-states in the North, which chose to subject 
themselves to the Emperor and became his allies. Finally, twenty five city-states (mostly in the 
Center of Italy and thus farther away from the threat of the Emperor) chose to remain neutral. 
Panel C decomposes the free city-state effect in these three categories.  
 
When we measure social capital as number of non-profit organizations (column 1), the 
positive effect of the free city experience is similar for Lombard League towns and neutral towns.   20
This effect, however, is almost two times bigger than the impact of free city-states allied to the 
Emperor.  
The pattern is similar when we measure social capital as electoral participation (column 
2). In fact, the effect of free city-states allied to the Emperor is statistically not different from zero, 
while the effect of cities which were part of the Lombard League is 60% larger than the effect of 
neutral free city-states. The same is true when we measure social capital as the presence of an 
organ donation organization (column 3).  
That today’s social capital is linked not only to the existence of free city-states, but also 
to the nature of their experience is additional evidence in favor of a causal link between these two 
phenomena.  
 
3.3 The instrumental variable estimates  
While general geographical conditions within the Center-North are similar (especially 
when we control for the four macro regions in the last column of Table 3) and we have controlled 
for idiosyncratic differences in our regressions, it is still possible that some more subtle 
geographical characteristics affect both social capital and the probability of why a city became a 
free-city-state. To address this concern we should be able to find an instrument that affects the 
probability of becoming a free city-state, but does not affect the level of social capital directly.  
To find some instruments we dig into history. As we discussed in section 1.4, there are 
four factors that can explain heterogeneity in outcomes in the Center-North. One of these factors, 
being a cross-road of Roman roads, can hardly satisfy the condition for an instrument, which 
should be orthogonal to the error. Since Romans strategically chose the layout of roads and that 
of cities, being at a cross road of Roman roads could be still linked with potential trade benefits 
not captured by our regressions. Since trade can foster trust (as beautifully shown by Greif, 2006), 
we will use this indicator only as a control, not as an instrument.   
The second factor (strong presence of the Imperial army) is trickier. On the one hand, we 
do not know whether this is a cause or an effect: at the time of Charlemagne all Center-North 
Italy was divided into marches. The survival of strong marches, thus, could be the effect of lack 
of free city-states or the cause. On the other hand, these indicators would be highly clustered and 
very closely correlated with our macro regions.  
Hence, we are left with two determinants of variability in the probability of the formation 
of a city-state that we can use as instruments. The first is whether the city was the seat of a bishop. 
According to many historians (Reynolds, 1997; Milani, 2005; Jones, 1997; Tabacco, 1987; 
Pirenne, 1956) the presence of a religious authority fostered the necessary coordination to acquire   21
independence. The second is whether the city was founded by the Etruscans, as a proxy for its 
strategic location. The example of Orvieto (the capital of the Etruscan confederation) located on 
top of a cliff is very illustrative (see Figure 3).   
A priori there is no reason to fear that these two variables might have a direct effect on 
today’s social capital. Contrary to most situations, however, we will be able to test this 
assumption directly (see section 4.2)   
In Table 8 we analyze the explanatory power of these historical instruments. When we 
regress a free city dummy variable on bishop location and Etruscan origin, we find that both 
instruments have the expected sign and are highly statistically significant. A town that was the 
seat of a bishop is 73% more likely to become a free city-state than a town that was not. This 
result has some independent interest. While the role played by religious authorities in the 
formation of commune is mentioned in many history books, we were unable to find any evidence 
supporting it. Similarly, a town that was founded by the Etruscans is 17% more likely to become 
a free city-state.  
In column 2 we insert a number of geographical controls. Towns in the mountains are 
less likely to become free city-states, but so are towns along the coast and towns at the 
intersection of Roman roads. This later effect might capture the fact that Roman roads were 
helping not only trade, but also the Imperial army.  The effect of our two instruments, however, is 
unchanged.   
Finally, in column 3 we insert all the additional controls so to make it the first stage of 
our IV regression of social capital on the free city-state experience. The F-test for the excluded 
instruments is 66, reassuring us we do not have a weak instrument problem. While we postpone a 
more detailed discussion of the orthogonality of the instruments to section 4.2, it is worth noticing 
that having two instruments we can use the test of over-identifying restrictions to check the 
validity of one condition on the validity of the other.    
Table 9 presents the IV estimates for our three measures of social capital. When we 
measure social capital as a number of non-profit organizations (column 1), the positive effect of 
the free city experience is virtually identical to the one estimated by using WLS and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. In this case, the test of over-identifying restrictions cannot reject the 
exogeneity of the instruments.  
When we measure social capital as electoral participation (column 2) the coefficient 
estimated by using IV is sixty percent larger than the WLS coefficient. In this case, however, we 
fail to pass the test of over-identifying restrictions.    22
Finally, when we measure social capital as the presence of an organ donation 
organization (column 3) the positive effect of the free city experience doubles with respect to the 
WLS one. The test of over-identifying restrictions cannot reject the exogeneity of the instruments.  
As a robustness exercise, in columns (4)-(6) we report the IV estimates using the 
definition of independent city-states based on the year 1300 classification. In spite of the different 
classification, results are similar to the ones obtained when the Communes are identified on the 
base on the cities independence status in 1176. We have also used a third definition that combines 
the other two and classifies a city as having been a Commune if either it was a commune in 1176 
or in the year 1300 or both. Results (unreported) confirm the findings in Table 9. Finally, we also 
tried excluding Tuscany – the Etruscans mainland – to check whether results differed when 
Etruscan colonies rather than the Etruscan mainland are relied upon as instruments, but the results 
do not change.   
 
4. The Difference in Difference Approach     
Overall, our IV estimates support a causal link between the free city-state experience and 
the higher level of social capital today. Nevertheless, it is still possible that some unobserved (or 
poorly measured) morphological characteristics might drive all our results. If there is a location 
advantage that has lead the Etruscans to settle there, has lead the Catholic Church to elect it as a 
headquarters for its bishop, has made it easier for that city to conquer independence from the 
Emperor, and also foster social capital today,  then our instruments do not solve the problem.  
 
4.1 Difference in difference estimates  
To address this issue, we use a difference in difference approach, based on an historical 
counterfactual. Because of the strong central power exerted by the Norman Kingdom, cities in the 
South of Italy could not have become free city-states regardless of their location and coordination 
advantage (Putnam, 1993). Under the maintained hypothesis that the determinants of location 
advantages are the same in the Center North and South, we can use the Center North sample to 
estimate a probit model and then apply it to southern cities to predict which towns would have 
become free city-states had the Normans not been there. We can then compare the level of social 
capital of free city-states in the Center-North and potential free city-states in the South, using the 
difference in social capital between not free city-states in the Center-North and unlikely free city-
states in the South as a control for generic differences between North and South.  
The first step in this approach is to predict the probability of becoming an independent 
city. To this purpose we use a version of the first stage regression in Table 8, restricting ourselves   23
to ex ante variables. As a substitute for today’s population we use the earliest estimates (year 
1300) of population size that we could get from Bairoch et al. (1988). Since these estimates are 
very imprecise, we approximate this information with two dummies: cities with at least 10,000 
inhabitants (34 cities, labeled “large”) and cities with between 1,000 and 10,000 inhabitants (18 
cities, labeled “medium”). The omitted category is cities with less than 1000 inhabitants in 1300 
or for which this information was not available.  
Table 10 Panel A shows these estimates. The effects are very similar to the ones obtained 
in the first stage regression. The pseudo R-squared of the regression is 0.61, reflecting the high 
explanatory power of our regression.  
In Panel B we show the summary statistics of the predicted probability divided between 
cities that experienced the Commune and cities that did not. For free city-states the predicted 
probability has a median of 0.88 and an interquartile range from 0.35 to 0.99. For non free city-
states the predicted probability has a median of 0.012 and an interquartile range from 0.012 to 
0.13. If we choose as a threshold level 0.35 we misclassify less than 8% of the observations: 17 
towns out of 339 as having had a Commune, while they did not, while 15 towns as not having had 
a Commune while they did. We then use the coefficient of this probit to predict the probability of 
becoming a free city-state for towns in the South.
9  
Panel C reports the summary statistic of this predicted probability. When we apply the 
same threshold used for Center-North regions to southern cities we obtain that there would have 
been 31 free city-states in the South, out of the 286 towns that made our threshold of population 
in 1871. The interquartile range of the predicted probability for cities that we classify as potential 
free city-states in the South is between 0.36 to 0.87. For non potential free city-states in the South 
the interquartile range is 0.01 to 0.028. Both are very similar to the ones observed in the Center-
North for the corresponding categories. This reassures us that the actual matches are good ones.  
Table 11 Panel A reports the averages of social capital in the four groups for the number 
of non-profit organizations over population and for the other two measures. In the Center-North, 
the average number of non-profit organizations for predicted communes is 6.2 versus an average 
of 5.1 for non predicted communes. This difference of 1.1 is statistically significant at the 2% 
level. To control for other potential differences between North and South we compute the 
difference between social capital in predicted communes (3.5) and non predicted communes (3.1) 
in the South. This difference 0.35 is not statistically different from zero (second column, third 
row). Finally, we compute the difference in difference estimation by subtracting this latter 
                                                 
9 We exclude from the Southern cities those located in the island of Sardinia because this island had a very 
different history, with some partial autonomy that did not take the form of free city-states.    24
estimate from the earlier one; this  yields a difference of 0.75, which  is statistically significant at 
the 5% level. The other columns repeat the exercise for referenda turnout and for the existence of 
a organ donation organization.      
Table 11 Panel B reports the difference in difference estimation in a regression format. 
Our measures of social capital are regressed on a dummy for the South, a dummy for potential 
free city-states, and an interaction dummy between potential free city-states and a Northern 
dummy.  
In column 1 we report estimates for the number of non profit organizations per capita 
without adding any other control. The Southern dummy is negative (-1.98) and highly statistically 
significant: a town located in the South has 36% less social capital than a similar town in the 
Center-North. By contrast, the predicted commune dummy by itself is economically and 
statistically insignificant. It is only when interacted with the Northern dummy that this variable 
becomes significant. The actual free city-state experience increases social capital by 15%. This 
effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. This result suggests that having the conditions to 
become free city-states alone is not sufficient to foster more social capital. It is only when those 
conditions can lead to the actual creation of free city-states that social capital increases.   
In column 2 of Panel B we re-run the difference in difference regression controlling for 
heterogeneity in the size of the towns and other geographical and economic conditions. The 
results are, if anything, stronger.   
In columns 3 and 4 we repeat the estimates using referenda turnout as our measure of 
social capital; we find a very large and significant effect of the Southern dummy, which can 
account for a difference in participation in referenda of about 19 percentage points. However we 
cannot detect any difference between predicted free cities and non-predicted ones. Results are 
instead consistent with free cities stimulating social capital when we measure it with the existence 
of an organ donation organization (columns 5 and 6). A city in the South has a 7 percentage 
points lower probability of having an organ donations organization, but within South predicted 
free cities are not different from non predicted free cities, while they are within North, as it 
should be if the free city historical episodes still foster social capital.          
If instead of our simple probit, we identify the predicted commune in the South by using 
the Abadie et al (2004) routine, we obtain 29 rather than 33 matches, half of which overlap. But 
the final results are very similar, as Panel C shows.    
Our difference in difference estimates suggest that only 47% of the 69% difference in 
social capital measured by the number of non-profit organizations between the Center North and 
the South can be directly attributed to the free city-state experience. It is possible (in fact likely)   25
that through interaction and migration the positive effect of free city-states spilled over into 
neighboring towns, increasing the average social capital of the Center-North. Alternatively, it is 
possible that other historical and/or geographical variables are responsible for the remaining half 
of the gap. Our approach is unable to distinguish between these two hypotheses. 
 
4.2 Validating the instruments   
A more direct way to validate our instruments is to exploit the fact that we know how history in 
the South evolved. Since even in the presence of favorable conditions, southern cities could not 
become independent, we can test the key identifying assumption of our instruments: that they do 
not have a direct effect on today social capital. In other words, if our two instruments are really 
orthogonal to the left hand side variable, we must see that in the South (where they could not 
affect the formation of free cities) they are uncorrelated with the current level of social capital, 
while in the Center North (where they did affect the formation of free cities) they are correlated.  
Table 12 Panel A presents the result of this test. The first three columns report the effect 
of being the seat of a bishop and being founded by the Etruscan on our three measures of social 
capital. In the South, towns that were the seat of a bishop in year 1000 have no more social 
capital than cities that were not. This validates the exclusion restriction.   
When it comes to being founded by the Etruscans, this variable has a negative (not 
positive) effect on our different measures of social capital and the coefficient is even statistically 
significant when social capital is measured as non-profit associations per capita. Thus, the worry 
that this variable has a positive direct effect on social capital is unfounded. In addition, the fact 
we pass the test of over-identifying restrictions guarantees us that if one instrument is valid (in 
this case being the seat of a bishop), the other is valid as well.        
For comparison, columns (4)-(6) show the corresponding reduced form estimates for the 
Center North sample. We can never reject the hypothesis that the two instruments are jointly 
statistically significant (see the F test at the bottom of the table). Furthermore, in all the 
regressions the instruments have a positive effect on social capital, consistent with the idea that 
they facilitated the emergence of the free cities.  
One further way we can check the validity of at least one of our instruments – the bishop 
city indicator - is by looking at the effect of bishop cities that had been created after the free city-
state period rather than before.  If there is something positive about being the seat of a bishop, not 
linked to the communal experience, it should also manifest itself in cities that became a seat in the 
last 800 years. By contrast, if the only reason why bishop cities have a higher social capital today 
is because of the presence of the bishop in 1000 facilitated the emergence of the commune, then   26
we should find that bishop cities that were created after the commune period have no positive 
effect on social capital.  
In our sample of Center-Northern cities, there are 63 cities that became the seat of a 
bishop after the end of the communal experience, i.e. after 1400. In Table 12 Panel B we report 
both reduced form regressions and IV regression that include as a control the post-medieval 
bishop seats. In all cases the post-medieval bishop cities indicator is not statistically significant, 
while all the other variables retain essentially the same coefficient. This is further evidence that 
the effect of being a seat of a bishop works through the increased probability of being free city-
states and not directly.   
 
 5. The Economic Effect of Social Capital      
  Social capital is ultimately important insomuch as it can affect economic outcomes. Yet, 
to identify the causal effect of social capital on the level of income one needs to find a source of 
exogenous variation in social capital. In our context one natural candidate is to use the free city 
indicator or alternatively the bishop city and the Etruscan city indicators as instruments for social 
capital. Having checked the predictive power and validity of these instruments as shifters of 
social capital one could think of exploiting them to study the effect of social capital on economic 
outcomes.
10  
We measure economic performance at the city level by using disposable income per 
capita in the city in 1999 as constructed from income tax statements. To make sure that the results 
are not affected by differential incentives to cheat on taxes, we check results with a measure of 
per capita wealth at the city level obtained by totaling housing wealth (in 1999) and bank deposits 
(in 2002) in the city and dividing by the city population.    
Table 13, first column, shows the results of the OLS estimates obtained using the sample 
of cities in the Center-North. We measure social capital with the total number of non-profit 
organizations. We control for geography (city altitude and steepness, closeness to the sea and 
whether it is located at the intersection of two or more Roman roads), city population (linear and 
square) to account for city externalities in production and for the inequality of land ownership as 
well as for a full set of province dummies that account for heterogeneity in productivity across 
                                                 
10 That our instruments are orthogonal to the error in the social capital equation does not automatically 
ensure that they are orthogonal to the error in the per capita income equation. In particular, there could be 
ways in which the free city-state experience affect today income directly and not only via the accumulated 
level of social capital. We will return to this point momentarily.    27
areas or other unobservables that are both correlated with income and social capital across 
provinces.  
We find that cities that have more social capital also have a higher per capita income: a 
one standard deviation increase in social capital is associated with a higher per capita disposable 
income of about 800 euros – 5.3% of the sample mean. This effect is only slightly lower if we 
insert a full set of dummies for the provincial  capitals to capture differences in income and social 
capital that may be generated by the administrative status of the city (column 2). This positive 
correlation is consistent with the one found in Knack and Keefer (1997) by using cross country 
variation. The additional contribution of our estimates is that they rely only on variation across 
cities within a rather homogeneous area and thus they exclude the possibility that the effect 
captures some institutional variable that drives both income and social capital.      
Even so, however, the observed correlation may all be driven by reverse causality – 
higher income fostering more social capital. To address this issue, in column 3 (controlling for 
province dummies) and in column 4 (adding also province capital dummies) we run IV 
regressions, where we use as an instrument for social capital whether a city was a commune in 
1167. Our previous results suggest that historical independence has a lot of predictive power on 
today’s social capital and can thus constitute a powerful instrument. If past history of 
independence has no direct effect on today’s city ability to produce income (an assumption to 
which we return below), this is also a valid instrument.   
When we instrument today’s social capital with the free city indicator, the estimated 
coefficient of social capital increases from 0.40 to around 0.57 and is highly statistically 
significant (columns 3 and 4). Raising social capital by one standard deviation increases per 
capita income by 1,120 euros, about 7.5% of the sample mean. This result suggests that reverse 
causality is unlikely to be driving the results as in this case the IV regressions should have yielded 
a lower estimate. It is social capital that is most likely to drive income, not the other way around. 
The high value of the F test of the excluded instrument (29.7 and 15.8 respectively, depending on 
whether controls for province capital are also included) implies that historical independence is a 
powerful instrument.   
There is, however, one difficulty with this approach. While having been a free city may 
be a true factor in explaining social capital, it may fail as an instrument for social capital in an 
income regression. Having been a free city may have resulted, for instance, in accumulated assets 
of some sort that still directly affect income today, besides affecting it indirectly because of its 
boost on social capital. Moreover, we cannot rely on the southern sample to check the validity of 
this instrument because we do not observe communes in the South. Using the bishop city   28
indicator and the Etruscan city indicator is not a solution either. Even if in the South these 
variables had not explanatory power in a reduced form regression of income, we still could not 
use them as instruments for social capital in an income regression in the North since, as we have 
argued, they affect social capital precisely because they facilitated the emergence of the free city 
and thus also of all the unobservable assets that may continue to affect a city income today.  
To address this issue we control directly for the most likely type of asset (besides social 
capital) that free cities created and that still generates income: historical attractions and arts that 
result in a richer tourist industry in the city. The wonderful piazzas, towers, and buildings, which 
commune such as Florence and Orvieto built, are certainly valuable assets today. They attract lots 
of visitors contributing to the production of income in these cities. For this reason, in column (5) 
of Table 13 we add to the regression the annual number of visitors to the city as a proxy for the 
inherited endowment of historical attractions. This variable is positively correlated with the free 
city indicator, consistent with the idea that a free city may attract more visitors. Its effect on per 
capita income is positive, but not statistically significant and does not really alter the coefficient 
of social capital. This result suggests that the free city-state experience affects current income 
through social capital and not through the monuments it has created.  
We obtain similar results if instead of the indicator for a free city we use as instrument 
for social capital the (log) of the length of time a free city retained its independence (column 6) or 
the indicators of whether the city was the seat of a bishop in Medieval times and whether it had 
been founded by the Etruscan (column 7).
11 By using this later specification, the estimated effect 
of social capital on per capita income is 0.81 and is very precisely estimated. This point estimate 
implies that raising social capital by one standard deviation increases income per capita by 1,620 
euros, or 11% of sample mean. Not surprisingly, the power of these instruments in predicting 
social capital is lower than in predicting that of the free city as registered by the lower value of 
the F test of the excluded instruments.  As this may imply that our estimates suffer from a weak 
instrument problem it is particularly important that the instruments satisfy the orthogonality 
conditions. The extremely high p-value (p-value 0.976) of the Sargan test of over identifying 
restrictions implies that the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid cannot be rejected.  
                                                 
11 Using a similar argument one could argue that pre-medieval bishop cities and Etruscan cities may affect 
current income because themselves are tourists attractions thanks to the cathedrals and the historical sites 
that they have. The number of visitors should also account for  this effect; furthermore, for these two 
variables we can test whether it is actually the case that they affect income directly using the southern 
sample. When we run a reduced form regression of per capita income on the southern sample we find that 
Bishop city and Etruscan city indicators are never statistically significant either one by one or jointly (F test 
0.38, p-value  0.6850).        29
Table 14 repeats the estimates obtained in Table 13 with the level of per capita wealth as 
left hand side variable. Results are qualitatively similar but economically stronger: OLS estimates 
imply that one standard deviation increase in social capital raises per capita wealth by 4,000 euros 
(11% of mean wealth). This effect is about twice as large if social capital is instrumented with the 
indicator for free city. When the number of visitors per capita is added to the regression (column 
5) its coefficient is positive and statistically significant. Even in this case, however, the effect of 
social capital, while reduced by about 28%, continues to be strong and very precisely estimated. 
Finally by using the bishop city and the Etruscan city identifiers as instruments we obtain that one 
standard deviation increase in social capital raises per capita wealth by about 7,800 euros. As 
with the estimates of per capita income, the test of over identifying restrictions suggests that the 
orthogonally condition is satisfied.       
                 
6. Conclusions     
Putnam (1993) conjectures that the difference in social capital between the North and the South 
of Italy was due to the fact that during the Middle Ages the Center-North had communes, while 
the South not. This conjecture, which Putnam does not formally test, is intriguing for two reasons. 
First, it identifies a form in which social capital can be formed, through experience of positive 
cooperation at the local level. Second, it presupposes an enormous degree of persistence of this 
experience. If Putnam is correct, a lot of the observed persistence in economic development might 
be due to the persistence in the social capital built in the development process.   
  In this paper we test Putnam’s conjecture by using both the within difference in the 
Center-North and by doing a matched difference in difference estimation between the Center 
North and the South. Both methods suggest that Putnam’s conjecture was right and that at least 
47% of the North-South divide in Italy is due to the free city-state experience. More importantly, 
our results suggest that positive experiences of cooperation at the local level can have extremely 
long-lasting effects, even when the institutions associated with those experiences have all but 
vanished. This result has implications that reach much beyond Italy. What colonizers might have 
transferred in their colonies is not necessarily a set of institutions as in Acemoglu et al. (2001), 
but a different experience of cooperation or mistrust.      
What our paper does not address is through what mechanism this very long-term 
persistence takes place. Our main hypothesis is that the transmission process is cultural. There is 
growing evidence of a long term persistence of beliefs and values (Fernandez et al, 2004, GSZ, 
2006).  Tabellini (2008), for instance, models how an intergenerational transmission of values can 
occur through an overlapping socialization process. In our case, this would imply that inhabitants   30
of free city-states have different social norms to which future generations will conform, even 
when the institutions associated with those norms disappear. By contrast, GSZ (2008) model the 
intergenerational transmission of beliefs and show that even a brief positive experience of 
cooperation (2-3 generations) can have permanent effects on the beliefs (and hence of the social 
capital) of a community. In that paper, we also provide a small hint that this difference persists 
through cultural mechanisms:  major novels (written 150 years ago) in different parts of the 
countries reflect a very different set of beliefs on trust and cooperation.   
An alternative hypothesis is that this persistence occurs through informal institutions that 
foster socializations. Italian summers are populated by various athletic contests in costume, called 
palio, fought to commemorate some event or tradition of the Middle Ages. These civic 
celebrations, which foster social cohesion (Durkheim, 1915), are rooted in the free city tradition. 
Faenza, for example has its Palio del Nimballo, while Sinigallia (as far as we know) does not 
have one. These (and other) traditions could be an alternative mechanism through which an 
historical experience relives today and affects current levels of social capital.  
A third hypothesis is related to the architectural design of towns.  The main 
distinguishing architectural feature of free city-states was the presence of a piazza designed not 
for religious purposes, but for civic purposes. The piazza was the place where the assembly of the 
commune took place and where important political decisions were made. To this day, these 
piazza are at the center of city life and are areas where citizens meet and socialize. To the extent 
city design can affect the interaction between its inhabitants, the architectural legacy of 
communes can still foster social interaction (and thus social capital) today.  We plan to 
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A.  Measures of social capital  
 
Number of  non-profit organizations: the measure are obtained from the National Statistical 
Institute (Istat) 2001 census which collected data on all types of non-profit and voluntary 
organizations existing in Italy at times of census. It reports data on the total number of non-
profit organizations, and separately on the number of voluntary associations, social 
cooperatives and foundations. The total number of non-profit organizations includes all the 
above types; voluntary organizations are the bulk of the total.  
 
Referenda turnout: We measure voter turnout in referenda by averaging participation over 
three major referenda that took place after WWII and for which information at the town level 
was more easily accessible: these are the referenda on public order measures that restricted 
individual freedoms and on political parties public funding that took place on June 11, 1978, 
the referenda on abortion (May 17 1981) and that on wage indexation schemes (June 9, 1985). 
While several other referenda have taken place after WWII on a wide range of issues (e.g. 
choice between republic and monarchy (1946), divorce (1974), hunting regulation (1987), use 
of nuclear power (1987)), data at the city level were only available on paper and more easily 
obtainable from the Ministry of Interior for these referenda. However, referenda turnout tends 
to be highly correlated across different referenda. For instance, at the provincal level the 
correlation between turnout at the divorce referenda and average turnout in the other 
referenda is 0.95 while the correlation between the turnout at the three referenda used here is 
between 0.91 (funding to political parties and abortion) and 0.93 (abortion and indexation 
schemes). In Italy, voting at referenda is not mandatory.  
 
Presence of an organ donation organization: The indicator of existence of an organ donation 
organization in the city was obtained from the 2005 Provincial Register of Voluntary 
Organizations. The registry reports the name, mission and address of the voluntary 
organizations located in the province. Registering with the Registry is not compulsory and 
since not all voluntary associations register, they provide an incomplete picture of the 
voluntary organizations in the municipality. Furthermore, in several regions in the South, the 
Registry is not yet available. However, for all regions in the Center-North in our sample we 
have been able to obtain a copy of the Registry from the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Policies and identified the presence of a branch of AIDO – the only organ donation 
organization in Italy – in the municipality. For the South sample we obtained the information 
by contacting directly each AIDO organization in the province capital and asking for the list 
of cities in their province with an AIDO association. AIDO was founded in 1973, thus much 
later than the blood donation association, and is present in about 2060 municipalities (out of 
8,000 in the country) and counts 1,129,662 donors.            
              
B.  Historical variables  
 
Commune: this is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the town was a commune according to 
two historical maps of Italy contained in “Atlante Storico De Agostini” (2007), Istituto 
Geografico De Agostini, Novara pp. 61-62. We use two maps. The first map shows lists of 
free cities around the time of the war between the communal cities and the Emperor of the   35
Holy Roman Empire Frederick I “Barbarossa” in the year 1167. This map is reported in 
Figure 1 (corresponding to map 28 in Atlante Storico De Agostini). The red line in the map 
marks the border of the Kingdom of Italy under the Holy Roman Empire. Communes are 
those marked with a black dot. The map also distinguishes which cities joined the Lombard 
League (names written in red) in the war for independence against the Emperor and which 
were allied to the Emperor (names written in blue). The remaining cities were neutral. This 
constitutes our first measure of free cities. The second measure is obtained from the map of 
Italy around the year 1300, as shown in Figure 2 (map 29 in Atlante Storico De Agostini); 
free cities are those that have a territory. A third measure is constructing as the union of the 
previous two measures.  
 
Length of independence: Information on when independence was acquired and when it was 
lost has been obtained through a search from different sources: the main one is the “Istituto 
Enciclopedia italiana per le Regioni”; when the information was not available in “Istituto 
Enciclopedia italiana per le Regioni” we relied on the Touring Club guide which reports a 
brief historical summary of the cities listed in the guide and the historical summary on the 
official web page of the various cities.         
 
City was a seat of a Bishop before 1000 C.E.: This identifier is obtained from the map “Italia 
altomedioevale: sedi vescovili” that reports the Bishop cities in the late Middle Ages. Bishop 
cities were mostly formed between the first and the third century AD, as the Christian 
movement spread out. 
     
City was a seat of a Bishop after 1400 C.E.:. This variable is equal to 1 if a city has become a 
bishop city after year 1400, roughly after end of the communal experience. Late bishop cities 
have been identified from the full list of the Italian Bishop cities as listed in the following link   
http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elenco_delle_diocesi_italiane which also summarizes their 
history and reports the year or century in which the bishop city was founded. Since some 
bishop cities that were active in the XI century were subsequently discontinued or moved 
somewhere else (as for instance Udine and Gorizia which replaced Acuileia) we have used 
the map “Italia altomedioevale: sedi vescovili” from Atlante Storico Treccani, Volume I, 
Roma 2007, maps n. 152, 153 , 154, 155  to identify the old bishop cities and the list of 
current bishop cities to identify those created after the year 1400.     
 
Etruscan city: is an identifier for whether the city was founded by the Etruscans and was part 
of the Etruscan “nation”. Moving from Etruria – the region between the river Arno and the 
river Tiber (corresponding approximately to today’s regions of  Tuscany, Umbria and 
northern Lazio) – Etruscans founded two other city clusters, one north of Tuscany, in 
Romagna, and in Campania, South of Lazio. Since the Etruscans thought that number 12 had 
a magic power, these clusters included 12 cities each, though some uncertainty still remains 
on the exact list of Etruscan cities. Etruscans were organized as a system of independent and 
self-governed cities, which tended to coordinate their policies in an annual meeting that took 
place in Orvieto – the Etruscans capital. Data on Etruscan cities have been provided by Dr. 
Antonello Montesanti, an archeologist who has rigorously mapped and classified all the 
Etruscan and Roman cities and who has kindly made his files available to us. The table below 
lists the three clusters of 12 Etruscan cities in the three areas where they expanded. Cities in 
italics have no counterpart today. In the Etruscan cluster of Etruria two cities – Fiesole and 
Roselle – were added to replace cities that decayed progressively under the Romans. 
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Cluster of Etruscan 
cities in Etruria 
Cluster of Etruscan 
cities in Romagna 
Cluster of Etruscan 
cities in Campania 
Veio  Bologna (capital)  Capua (capital) 
Cerveteri Mantova Nola 
Tarquinia Ravenna  Urina 
Montalto di Castro  Cesena  Velsu 
Arezzo Rimini  Irnthi 
Vetulonia Modena  Pontecagnano 
Populonia Parma  Sorrento 
Volterra Piacenza  Pompei 
Orvieto (capital)  Spina  Ercolano 
Chiusi Marzabotto  Nocera 
Perugia Adria  Acerra 




Size of city in year 1300 C.E.:   We have classified two indicators for the size of cities in 
theyear 1300: Large is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the city population exceeds 10,000 
people in year 1300; Medium is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the city population is between 
1,000 and 10,000 people in that year. The information on city size is obtained from Bairoch, 
Batou and Chevre (1988, pp. 40-49) who report the population of European cities from year 
800 up to year 1850 at a frequency of about every 100 years. The criteria for including a city 
in the list is that it must have had at least 5,000 inhabitants once between 800 and 1850. 
Needless to say, the more one goes back on time the more difficult it is to find information on 
population, which results in a missing observation. We have chosen the population in the year 
1300 to balance the need to go as far back as possible and closer to year 1,000 while at the 
same time  being able to have enough information on city population. The year 1300 is the 
first for which missing data appear to be limited. 
 
City located at an intersection of Roman roads:  is equal to 1 if the city is located on a 
relevant Roman road or at the intersection between two or more Roman roads. Roman roads 
are identified from the Touring Club Historical Atlas of Italy and from the “Reference Map of 
Ancient Italy” and then by comparing today location of the city using Google Maps with the 
map of the Roman cities.         
   
 
C.  City controls and measures of economic development 
The main source for several city controls and variables is the database “Le Misure dei 
Comuni”, 2003-2004 Edition. This database is assembled by Ancitel, the association of 
municipal administrations and reports about 320 variables measuring various items at the 
level of the city ranging from population to income, bank deposits and households.   
 
City elevation: It is measured in meters from the sea level. Source:  “Le Misure dei Comuni”    
 
Max difference in elevation: It is the difference between the highest and the lowest point in 
the city territory, in meters. Source:  “Le Misure dei Comuni” 
 
Current Population: number of inhabitants according to the 2001 census. Source:  “Le 
Misure dei Comuni”    37
 
Population at unification: number inhabitants in 1871 according to the 1871 census. Source:  
Istat, “Census Data”  
 
Number of visitors: number of people that visited the city either in hotels or other premises in 
a year, scaled by city population. Source:  “Le Misure dei Comuni”  
   
Gross per capita disposable income: level of disposable income per capita: euros in the year 
2000; the figure is obtained from tax filings at the city level and the original source is the 
Ministry of Finance. Source:  “Le Misure dei Comuni”  
 
Per capita household wealth: sum of property wealth and bank deposits divided by the city 
population; property wealth is estimated by Ancitel and refers to 1999; bank deposits are 
referred to 2002. The figure is in euros. Source:  “Le Misure dei Comuni”  
 
Gini land owenership inequality index: computed using data on the size distribution of 
agricultural firms in the year 2000 based on information from the 2001 census. Source:  “Le 
Misure dei Comuni”.    
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Figure 1 – Historical map of Italy at around year 1167 
The figure shows the map of Italy at around year 1167. The red line marks the borders of the country that 
where the Holy Roman Empire of Germany. All the towns marked with a full dot were commune.  Towns 
in red were commune that belonged to the Lombard League, those in blue were allied to the Emperor. The 
green areas mark the territories of various Principati and Feudi.  The Southern part of Italy not belonging to 
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Figure 2 – Historical map of Italy at around year 1300 
The figure shows the map of Italy at around year 1300. It shows the communes and their territory (contado), 
as well as the principati that were ruling in various areas.   
 
 




Figure 3. Orvieto’s strategic advantage  
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Table 1 




















Bishop city?  Etruscan city? 
ABBIATEGRASSO  0 0  10.11  0 0 0  0  0  0 0 
ACQUI TERME  1  1  10.381  1150  1313  0  1  0  1 0 
ADRIA 0  1  17.732  1090  1200  0  0  0  1 1 
ALATRI  0 0  13.841  0 0 0  0  0  1 0 
ALBA 1  1  10.815  1050  1259  0  1  0  1 0 
ALESSANDRIA 1  1  56.962  1198  1348  1  0  0  1 0 
ALFONSINE  0 0  8.873  0 0 0  0  0  0 0 
AMATRICE  0 0  8.226  0 0 0  0  0  0 0 
AMELIA  0 0  8.11  0 0 0  0  0  1 0 
ANAGNI  0 0  8.256  0 0 0  0  0  1 0 
ANCONA 0  1  48.738  1177  1532  0  0  0  1 0 
ANGHIARI  0 0  7.015  0 0 0  0  0  0 0 
AOSTA  0 0  7.749  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
ARCEVIA  0 0  9.633  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
ARCIDOSSO  0 0  6.685  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
AREZZO  1  1  39.054  1098  1337 0  0 1 1 1 
ARGENTA  0 0  16.287  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
ARPINO  0 0  11.633  0 0 0  0  1  0  0 
ARSIE'  0 0  6.884  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
ARZIGNANO  0 0  8.264  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
ASCIANO  0 0  7.235  0 0 0  0  0  0  1 
ASCOLI  PICENO  0 0  23.295  0 0 0  0  0  1  0 
ASSISI  1  0  15.083  1000  1367 0  0 0 1 0 
ASTI  1  1  36.917  1150  1313 0  1 0 1 0 
AVIANO  0 0  7.922  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
BADIA  POLESINE  0 0  9.303  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
BAGNACAVALLO  0 0  15.101  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
BAGNI  DI  LUCCA  0 0  12.403  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
BAGNO  DI  ROMAGNA  0 0  7.583  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
BARBERINO DI 
MUGELLO 
0 0  9.639  0 0 0  0    0  0 
BARDI  0 0  9.736  0 0 0  0  0  0  0   42
BARGA  0 0  8.316  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
BARGE  0 0  9.917  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
BASSANO  DEL  GRAPPA  1  0  15.284  1175  1250 0  0 0 0 0 
BEDONIA  0 0  9.051  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
BELLUNO  1  1  15.971  1050  1350 0  0 0 1 0 
BERGAMO  1  1  42.662  1125  1428 1  0 0 1 0 
BERTINORO  0 0  6.624  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
BIELLA  0 0  17.24  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
BOLOGNA  1  1  118.217  1116  1274 1  0 1 1 1 
BOLZANO  0 0  25.238  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
BONDENO  0 0  13.424  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
BORGO  A  MOZZANO  0 0  9.056  0 0 0  0    0  1 
BORGO  SAN  LORENZO  0 0  12.289  0 0 0  0  0  0  1 
BORGO  VAL  DI  TARO  0 0  8.591  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
BORGOMANERO  0 0  9.641  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
BORGONOVO VAL 
TIDONE 
0 0  6.659  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
BOVES  0 0  9.744  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
BRA  0 0  13.658  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
BRESCIA  1  1  58.539  1125  1258 1  0 0 1 0 
BRESSANONE  0 0  7.46  0 0 0  0  1  0  0 
BRISIGHELLA  0 0  12.434  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
BUCINE  0 0  7.525  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
BUDRIO  0 0  16.608  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
BUSCA  0 0  9.844  0 0 0  0  1  0  0 
BUSSETO  0 0  8.603  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
BUSTO  ARSIZIO  0 0  16.598  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CAGLI  0 0  10.505  0 0 0  0  0  1  0 
CALCI  0 0  6.79  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CAMAIORE  0 0  16.967  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CAMERINO  0 0  12.157  0 0 0  0  1  1  0 
CAMOGLI  0 0  9.807  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CAMPI  BISENZIO  0 0  14.375  0 0 0  0    0  1 
CANTU'  0 0  7.97  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CAPANNORI  0 0  39.3  0 0 0  0    0  0   43
CARAGLIO  0 0  7.074  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CARAVAGGIO  0 0  7.888  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CARIGNANO  0 0  7.711  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CARMAGNOLA  0 0  13.247  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CARMIGNANO  0 0  8.144  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CARPI  0 0  17.913  0 0 0  0  1  0  0 
CARRARA  0 0  23.326  0 0 0  0  1  0  0 
CASALE  MONFERRATO  0 0  27.908  0 0 0  0  1  0  0 
CASALMAGGIORE 0 0  13.283  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CASCINA  0 0  19.332  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CASSANO  D'ADDA 0 0  7.053  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CASSINO  0 0  12.54  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CASTEL  SAN  GIOVANNI  0 0  8.475  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CASTEL SAN PIETRO 
TERME 
0 0  12.691  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CASTELFIORENTINO  0 0  8.727  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CASTELFRANCO  EMILIA  0 0  12.732  0 0 0  0  0  0  1 
CASTELFRANCO  VENETO  0 0  10.719  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CASTELLAMONTE 0 0  8.815  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CASTELLEONE  0 0  6.818  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CASTELNOVO  NE'MONTI  0 0  6.863  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CASTELNUOVO 
BERARDENGA 
0 0  7.89  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CASTELNUOVO SCRIVIA  0  0 7.301 0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
CASTIGLION 
FIORENTINO 
0 0  13.097  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CASTIGLIONE  DEL  LAGO  0 0  10.539  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CAVARZERE  0 0  15.038  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CAVOUR  0 0  7.449  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CECCANO  0 0  7.044  0 0 0  0  1  0  0 
CENTO  0 0  19.611  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CEREA  0 0  6.723  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CERTALDO  0 0  7.237  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CESENA  1  1  38.528  1190  1350 0  1 1 1 1 
CHERASCO  0 0  8.991  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CHIARI  0 0  9.515  0 0 0  0  0  0  0   44
CHIAVARI  0 0  12.008  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CHIERI  0  1  12.248  1150  1350 1  0 0 0 0 
CHIOGGIA  0 0  28.051  0 0 0  0  0  1  0 
CHIUSA  DI  PESIO  0 0  6.738  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CHIVASSO  0 0  9.123  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CINGOLI  0 0  12.577  0 0 0  0  1  0  0 
CITTA'  DELLA  PIEVE  0 0  6.755  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CITTA' DI CASTELLO  0  1  24.216  1150  1400  0  0  1  0  0 
CITTADELLA  0 0  8.57  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CIVIDALE  DEL  FRIULI  0 0  8.413  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CIVITANOVA  MARCHE  0 0  9.17  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CIVITAVECCHIA  0 0  9.718  0 0 0  0  0  0  1 
CODOGNO  0 0  11.462  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CODROIPO  0 0  8.36  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
COLLE  DI  VAL  D'ELSA  0 0  8.521  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
COLLESALVETTI  0 0  7.349  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
COLOGNA  VENETA  0 0  7.435  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
COLORNO  0 0  6.829  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
COMACCHIO  0 0  9.064  0 0 0  0  0  1  1 
COMO  1  1  33.369  1090  1311 1  0 0 1 0 
CONCORDIA SULLA 
SECCHIA 
0 0  9.466  0 0 0  0  0  1  0 
CONEGLIANO  0 0  7.872  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
COPPARO  0 0  11.865  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CORIO  0 0  6.99  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CORREGGIO  0 0  12.319  0 0 0  0  1  0  0 
CORRIDONIA  0 0  8.481  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CORTONA  0  1  26.441  1200  1323 0  0 1 0 1 
COSTIGLIOLE  D'ASTI  0 0  6.799  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
COTIGNOLA  0 0  6.881  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CREMA  1  1  16.175  1150  1449 0  0 0 0 0 
CREMONA  1  1  43.109  1150  1350 1  0 1 1 0 
CRESCENTINO  0 0  6.671  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CREVALCORE  0 0  10.815  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
CUNEO  0 0  23.453  0 0 0  0  0  0  0   45
DEMONTE  0 0  7.768  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
DRONERO  0 0  8.26  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
EMPOLI 1  0  16.672      0  0    0  1 
ESTE  0 0  10.037  0 0 0  0  1  0  0 
FABRIANO  0 0  19.771  0 0 0  0  1  0  0 
FAENZA  1  1  36.385  1120  1250 1  0 1 1 0 
FANO  0 0  20.053  0 0 0  0  1  1  0 
FELTRE  1 0  13.064  0 0 0  0  0  1  0 
FERENTINO  0 0  10.287  0 0 0  0  0  1  0 
FERMO  0 0  18.853  0 0 0  0  1  1  0 
FERRARA  1  1  67.306  1100  1267 1  0 1 1 1 
FERRIERE  0 0  7.411  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
FIDENZA  0 0  11.014  0 0 0  0  0  0  1 
FIESOLE  0 0  7.405  0 0 0  0  0  1  1 
FIGLINE  VALDARNO  0 0  9.781  0 0 0  0  0  0  1 
FILOTTRANO  0 0  8.453  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
FINALE  EMILIA  0 0  13.176  0 0 0  0  0  0  1 
FINALE  LIGURE  0 1  9.397  0 0 0  0  1  0  0 
FIORENZUOLA  D'ARDA  0 0  6.83  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
FIRENZE  1  1  201.138  1115  1434 0  0 1 1 1 
FIRENZUOLA  0 0  10.192  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
FIVIZZANO  0 0  15.451  0 0 0  0    0  0 
FOIANO  DELLA  CHIANA  0 0  7.819  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
FOLIGNO  0 0  21.197  0 0 0  0  0  1  0 
FONDI  0 0  6.727  0 0 0  0  0  1  0 
FORLI'  1  1  38.639  950  1315 1  0 1 1 1 
FORMIA  0 0  12.504  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
FORMIGINE  0 0  6.739  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
FOSSANO  0 0  16.684  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
FOSSOMBRONE  0 0  9.845  0 0 0  0  0  1  0 
FROSINONE  0 0  10.057  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
FUCECCHIO  0 0  11.021  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
GAETA  0 0  20.327  0 0 0  0  0  1  0 
GALLARATE  0 0  10.233  0 0 0  0  0  0  0   46
GALLIATE  0 0  7.318  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
GAMBOLO'  0 0  6.793  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
GARESSIO  0 0  7.129  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
GARLASCO  0 0  6.885  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
GEMONA  DEL  FRIULI  0 0  7.895  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
GENOVA  1  1  256.486  1162  1650 0  1 0 1 0 
GIAVENO  0 0  9.758  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
GONZAGA  0 0  7.072  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
GORIZIA  0 1  25.239  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
GREVE  IN  CHIANTI 0 0  11.35  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
GUALDO  TADINO  0 0  8.246  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
GUASTALLA  0 0  10.906  0 0 0  0    0  0 
GUBBIO  1  0  22.754  1150  1350 0  0 0 1 0 
IMOLA  1  0  29.157  1150  1325 0  1 0 1 0 
IMPRUNETA  0 0  7.166  0 0 0  0    0  0 
ITRI  0 0  6.619  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
IVREA  1  1  9.637  1100  1313 0  1 0 1 0 
JESI  0 0  19.307  0 0 0  0  0  1  0 
LA  SPEZIA  0 0  26.753  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
LARI  0 0  7.163  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
LASTRA  A  SIGNA  0 0  10.402  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
LAVAGNA  0 0  7.476  0 0 0  0  1  0  0 
LECCO  0 0  18.083  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
LEGNAGO  0 0  13.403  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
LEGNANO  0 0  6.949  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
LENDINARA  0 0  9.523  0 0 0  0  1  0  0 
LEONESSA  0 0  6.806  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
LERICI  0 0  6.906  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
LIVORNO  0 0  96.631  0 0 0  0  0  0  1 
LODI  1  1  25.514  1158  1402 1  0 0 1 0 
LONIGO  0 0  9.299  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
LORETO  0 0  8.333  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
LUCCA  1  1  70.537  1119  1314 0  0 1 1 1 
LUGO  0 0  25.246  0 0 0  0  0  0  0   47
LUZZARA  0 0  7.731  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
MACERATA  0 0  19.8  0 0 0  0  1  0  0 
MAGIONE  0 0  6.899  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
MANTOVA  1  1  33.783  1150  1272 1  0 1 1 1 
MARLIANA  0 0  6.999  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
MAROSTICA  0 0  8.322  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
MARRADI  0 0  8.42  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
MARSCIANO  0 0  10.917  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
MASSA  1  1  17.853  1050  1442 0  0 1 1 0 
MASSA  MARITTIMA  0 0  8.27  0 0 0  0  0  0  1 
MASSAROSA  0 0  9.172  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
MATELICA  0 0  7.521  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
MEDE  0 0  6.827  0 0 0  0  1  0  0 
MEDICINA  0 0  11.58  0 0 0  0  0  0  1 
MEL  0 0  7.185  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
MELDOLA  0 0  7.798  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
MERANO  0 0  15.153  0 0 0  0  1  0  0 
MILANO  1  1  290.514  1050  1311 1  0 1 1 0 
MINERBIO  0 0  7.454  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
MINTURNO  0 0  7.519  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
MIRA  0 0  8.603  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
MIRANDOLA  0 0  13.307  0 0 0  0  1  0  0 
MIRANO  0 0  7.367  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
MODENA  1  1  56.995  1115  1288 1  0 1 1 1 
MODIGLIANA  0 0  6.842  0 0 0  0  1  0  0 
MOLINELLA  0 0  10.938  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
MONCALIERI  0 0  10.926  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
MONDOVI'  0  1  17.232  1198  1305 0  0 0 0 0 
MONSELICE  0 0  9.802  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
MONTAGNANA  0 0  9.262  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
MONTALCINO  0 0  8.048  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
MONTE  SAN  SAVINO  0 0  8.173  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
MONTEBELLUNA  0 0  8.091  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
MONTEFIASCONE  0 0  7.231  0 0 0  0  0  0  0   48
MONTEPULCIANO  1  0  13.494  1100  1260 0  0 1 0 0 
MONTESPERTOLI  0 0  9.182  0 0 0  0  1  0  0 
MONTEVARCHI  0 0  9.77  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
MONTICELLI  D'ONGINA  0 0  7.199  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
MONTICHIARI  0 0  7.342  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
MONZA  0 0  25.266  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
MORTARA  0 0  7.482  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
MUGGIA  0 0  8.264  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
NARNI  0 0  11.261  0 0 0  0  0  1  0 
NORCIA  0 0  10.015  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
NOVARA  1  1  29.674  1050  1350 1  0 0 1 0 
NOVELLARA  0 0  7.253  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
NOVI  LIGURE  0 0  12.374  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
ODERZO  0 0  8.027  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
OLEGGIO  0 0  8.236  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
ORVIETO  1  0  14.431  1300  1350 0  0 0 1 1 
OSIMO  0 0  17.234  0 0 0  0  0  1  0 
OSTIGLIA  0 0  6.831  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
OVADA  0 0  7.045  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
PADOVA  1  1  64.862  1190  1237 1  0 1 1 0 
PAESANA  0 0  7.885  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
PALAIA  0 0  7.434  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
PARMA  1  1  68.889  1140  1300 1  0 1 1 1 
PAVIA  1  1  38.079  1100  1289 0  1 1 1 0 
PAVULLO NEL 
FRIGNANO 
0 0  10.237  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
PERGINE  VALSUGANA  0 0  8.208  0 0 0  0    0  0 
PERGOLA  0 0  9.356  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
PERUGIA  1  0  49.507  1000  1370 0  0 0 1 1 
PESARO  0 0  27.573  0 0 0  0  1  1  0 
PESCAGLIA  0 0  7.535  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
PESCIA  0 0  20.17  0 0 0  0  0  0  1 
PEVERAGNO  0 0  7.201  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
PIACENZA  1  1  45.707  1126  1313 1  0 1 1 1 
PIETRASANTA  0 0  12.085  0 0 0  0  1  0  1   49
PINEROLO  0 0  18.698  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
PIOVE  DI  SACCO  0 0  8.242  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
PISA  1  1  49.81  1050  1399 0  0 0 1 1 
PISTOIA  1  1  54.825  1117  1306 0  0 1 1 1 
POGGIBONSI  0 0  7.884  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
POIRINO  0 0  6.832  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
POMARANCE  0 0  7.311  0 0 0  0  0  0  1 
PONTASSIEVE  0 0  11.024  0 0 0  0    0  0 
PONTECORVO  0 0  10.812  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
PONTEDERA  0 0  12.02  0 0 0  0  0  0  1 
PONTEVICO  0 0  6.685  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
PONTREMOLI  0  1  14.33  1250  1313 0  0 0 0 0 
PORDENONE  0 0  9.561  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
PORTOGRUARO  0 0  9.182  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
PORTOMAGGIORE 0 0  9.697  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
POTENZA  PICENA  0 0  6.95  0 0 0  0  0  1  0 
PRATO  1  1  36.923  1150  1351 0  0 0 0 0 
QUARRATA  0 0  9.485  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
RACCONIGI  0 0  9.68  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
RAPALLO  0 0  11.112  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
RAVENNA  1 1  58.544  0 0 0  1  1  1  1 
RECANATI  0 0  13.982  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
REGGELLO  0 0  10.752  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
REGGIO  NELL'EMILIA  1  1  50.955  1100  1335 1  0 0 1 1 
RHO  0 0  7.39  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
RIETI  0 0  18.886  0 0 0  0  0  1  0 
RIMINI  1  1  29.732  1150  1216 0  1 1 1 1 
RIVAROLO  CANAVESE  0 0  6.708  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
ROSIGNANO  MARITTIMO  0 0  7.953  0 0 0  0  0  0  1 
ROVATO  0 0  7.48  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
ROVERETO  0 0  14.382  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
ROVIGO  0 0  23.633  0 0 0  0  1  0  0 
RUSSI  0 0  8.544  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SABBIONETA  0 0  7.273  0 0 0  0  0  0  0   50
SALUZZO  0 1  16.214  0 0 0  0  1  0  0 
SAN BENEDETTO DEL 
TRONTO 
0 0  7.077  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SAN  BENEDETTO  PO  0 0  10.399  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SAN CASCIANO IN VAL 
DI PESA 
0 0  12.605  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SAN COLOMBANO AL 
LAMBRO 
0 0  7.032  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SAN  DAMIANO  D'ASTI  0 0  8.366  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SAN DONA' DI PIAVE  0  0  8.01  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
SAN FELICE SUL 
PANARO 
0 0  9.124  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SAN  GIMIGNANO  0 0  8.251  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SAN GIOVANNI IN 
PERSICETO 
0 0  15.444  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SAN  GIULIANO  TERME  0 0  18.693  0 0 0  0  0  0  1 
SAN  MINIATO  1  0  16.229  1250  1369 0  0 0 0 0 
SAN  PIETRO  IN  CASALE  0 0  8.509  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SAN  REMO  0 0  12.89  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SAN SALVATORE 
MONFERRATO 
0 0  7.187  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SAN  SEVERINO  MARCHE  0 0  14.836  0 0 0  0  1  0  0 
SAN VITO AL 
TAGLIAMENTO 
0 0  8.853  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SANSEPOLCRO  0 0  8.2  0 0 0  0  1  0  1 
SANTA MARGHERITA 
LIGURE 
0 0  7.949  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SANT'ANGELO 
LODIGIANO 
0 0  8.876  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SANTARCANGELO DI 
ROMAGNA 
0 0  8.19  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SANT'ELPIDIO  A  MARE  0 0  7.203  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SARONNO  0 0  6.976  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SARZANA  0 0  9.629  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SASSO  MARCONI  0 0  7.299  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SASSOFERRATO  0 0  9.02  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SAVIGLIANO  1  0  16.409  1184  1350 0  0 0 0 0 
SAVONA  1  0  24.802  1191  1528 0  1 0 1 0 
SCANDIANO  0 0  7.823  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SCANDICCI  0 0  10.121  0 0 0  0  0  0  0   51
SCHIO  0 0  13.525  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SENIGALLIA  0 0  22.695  0 0 0  0  0  1  0 
SERAVEZZA  0 0  8.858  0 0 0  0  1  0  0 
SEREGNO  0 0  7.003  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SERMIDE  0 0  6.7  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SESTO  FIORENTINO  0 0  9.67  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SESTRI  LEVANTE  0 0  9.054  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SEZZE  0 0  8.89  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SIENA  1  1  31.844  1050  1399 0  0 0 1 1 
SIGNA  0 0  7.472  0 0 0  0  1  0  0 
SINALUNGA  0 0  9.072  0 0 0  0  0  0  1 
SONCINO  0 0  7.343  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SONDRIO  0 0  6.823  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SORA  0 0  12.137  0 0 0  0  0  1  0 
SORESINA  0 0  9.093  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SOVICILLE  0 0  7.904  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SPOLETO  0  1  21.168  1150  1354 0  0 0 1 0 
STAZZEMA  0 0  7.667  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
STRADELLA  0 0  8.294  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SUBIACO  0 0  7.525  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
SUZZARA  0 0  8.812  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
TARCENTO  0 0  8.259  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
TERNI  0 0  22.78  0 0 0  0  0  1  0 
TERRANUOVA 
BRACCIOLINI 
0 0  7.844  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
TIVOLI  0 0  7.449  0 0 0  0  0  1  0 
TODI  0 0  15.049  0 0 0  0  0  1  0 
TOLENTINO  0 0  11.422  0 0 0  0    0  0 
TORINO  1  1  210.873  1050  1280 0  1 1 1 0 
TORTONA  1  1  13.909  1150  1347 0  1 0 1 0 
TRECATE  0 0  7.075  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
TREIA  0 0  9.624  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
TRENTO  0 1  36.622  0 0 0  0  0  1  0 
TREVIGLIO  0 0  11.981  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
TREVISO  1  1  29.074  1150  1237 1  0 1 1 0   52
TRIESTE  0 0  171.436  0 0 0  0  0  1  0 
TRINO  0 0  9.916  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
UDINE  0 0  29.425  0 0 0  0  1  0  0 
UMBERTIDE  0 0  11.174  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
URBINO  0 0  15.786  0 0 0  0  1  1  0 
VALDAGNO  0 0  8.782  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
VALDOBBIADENE  0 0  7.931  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
VALENZA  0 0  10.724  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
VARALLO  1  0  7.488  1150  1395 0  0 0 0 0 
VARAZZE  0 0  9.528  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
VARESE  0 0  19.339  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
VARESE  LIGURE  0 0  8.063  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
VELLETRI  0 0  13.901  0 0 0  0  0  1  0 
VENEZIA  0  1  164.965  950  1797 1  0 0 0 0 
VENTIMIGLIA  1  0  7.406  1150  1261 0  1 0 1 0 
VERCELLI  1  1  56.962  1198  1348 1  0 0 1 0 
VEROLI  0 0  11.474  0 0 0  0  0  1  0 
VERONA  1  1  86.443  1150  1227 1  0 1 1 0 
VIADANA  0 0  15.641  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
VIAREGGIO  0 0  12.249  0 0 0  0    0  0 
VICCHIO  0 0  8.967  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
VICENZA  1  1  37.475  1110  1236 1  0 0 1 0 
VICOPISANO  0 0  6.648  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
VIGEVANO  0 0  19.833  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
VIGONE  0 0  6.689  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
VILLA  MINOZZO  0 0  7.411  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
VILLAFRANCA DI 
VERONA 
0 0  8.377  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
VILLAFRANCA 
PIEMONTE 
0 0  8.342  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
VIMERCATE  0 0  7.336  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
VINCI  0 0  6.646  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
VITERBO  1  0  27.232  1150  1251 0  0 0 1 1 
VITTORIO VENETO  1  0  16.268      0  0    0  0 
VOGHERA  0 0  15.454  0 0 0  0  0  0  0 
VOLTERRA  1  1  13.279  1239  1340 0  0 1 1 1   53
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A. Social capital measures (Center North sample; N=400) 
 Mean  Median  Standard 
deviation 
1st percentile  
 
99
th  percentile 
 
Number of non-profit organizations 
( per 1,000 people) 
 
5.31 5.03 1.99 2.18  11.95 
Referenda turnout (%)  86.70  87.88  5.59  66.07  94.87 
City has organ donation association? (Yes=1)  0.42  0  0.49  0  1 
 
    
Panel B. Historical variables (Center North sample; N=400) 
 Mean  Median  Standard 
deviation 
1st  percentile 
 
99
th  percentile 
 
Commune at time of war against Frederick I 
(1167 C.E.) 
 
0.14 0 0.35 0  1 
Commune  in  1300  C.E.       
Commune:  combined  definition       
Year independence was acquired 
(conditional on independence) 
1130 1150 62.48 950  1300 
Year independence was lost 
(conditional on independence) 
1326.68  1315 78.86 1216 1650 
Length of independence conditional on 
independence (# of years) 
196.47 175 100.41  47  488 
(log)  Length  of  independence  0.73 0 1.81 0 5.91 
City belonged to the Lombard League  0.06  0  0.24  0  1 
City was allied to the Emperor Frederick I  0.04  0  0.19  0  1 
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Panel C. City geography (Center North sample; N=400) 
 Mean  Median  Standard 
deviation 
1st  percentile 
 
99
th  percentile 
 
Elevation (thousand meters)  0.36  0.29  0.29  0.003  1.30 
Max difference in elevation within city 
territory  (thousand meters) 
0.66 0.46 0.66  0.004  2.64 
City located on the coast   0.08  0  0.27  0  1 
City located more than 5 kilometers from the 
sea  
0.03 0 0.18 0  1 
City located at intersection of Roman roads  0.108  0  0..31  0  1 
Population after unification in1871 (million 
people)  
0.018  0.009 0.03 0.007 0.21 
Current Population 2001 (million people) 
 
0.045  0.018 0.16 0.003 0.61 
 
 
        
Panel D. Economic Variables (Center North sample; N=400) 
 Mean  Median  Standard 
deviation 
 1st  percentile 
 
99
th  percentile 
 
Disposable income per capita (‘000  euros) 14.82  14.73 2.10  9.52 19.35 
Gross per capita household wealth (‘000  euros)  33.22 31.72 12.41 14.01 90.19 
Gini land ownership inequality index  0.63  0.63  0.13  0.32  0.91 
Gini  income  inequality  index  0.40 0.40 0.03 0.34 0.48 
Yearly number of visitors  divided by 
inhabitants 
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Panel E. Determinants of the probability of becoming a Commune (Center North sample; N=400) 
 Mean  Median  Standard 
deviation 
1st  percentile 
 
99
th  percentile 
 
Seat of a Bishop before 1000 C.E.? (Yes=1)  0.23  0  0.42  0  1 
City founded by the Etruscans? (Yes=1)    0.12  0  0.32  0  1 
City population above 10K in 1300 C.E.? (Yes=1)   0.09  0  0.28  0  1 
City population between 1K and 10K people in 
1300 C.E.? (Yes=1)   
0.05 0  0.21  0  1 
New seat of a Bishop after 1400?  (Yes=1)    0.07  0  0.26  0  1 
 
Panel F. Social capital indicators (South sample; N= 286)  
 Mean  Median  Standard 
deviation 
1st  percentile 
 
99
th  percentile 
 
Number of non-profit organizations ( per ‘000 
people) 
3.18  2.98 1.31 0.78 6.53 
Referenda  turnout  (%)  67.97  70.40 10.55 37.83 85.40 
City has an organ donation association? (Yes=1)  0.27  0.00  0.45  0  1 
 
Panel G. Historical variables that predict Commune (South sample; N= 286) 
 Mean  Median  Standard 
deviation 
1st percentile  
 
99
th  percentile 
 
Elevation  0.31  232  0.26 0.003 1.01 
Max difference in elevation within  city  territory  0.75  600  0.58 27 3.15 
Seat of a Bishop before 1000 C.E.? (Yes=1)  0.22  0  0.41  0  1 
City was founded by the Etruscans? (Yes=1)  0.02  0  0.15  0  1 
City population above 10K in 1300 C.E.? (Yes=1)   0.05  0  0.21  0  1 
City population between 1K and 10K in 1300 
C.E.? (Yes=1) 
0.14  0 0.34 0  1 
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  Table 3. Effect of communal history on the number of non-profit organizations 
The table shows OLS estimates of the effect of having been an independent city on the number of non-profit organizations per inhabitant in the city. Regressions are 
weighted using city population. Panel A is run on the sample of the 400 largest towns located in the Center-North of Italy (as of 1871). Panel B includes the whole sample 
of cities in the same area. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *** significant at less than 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.  
Panel A: Sample of 400 largest towns in the Center-North    















Commune  0.42 1.12*** 1.05***  0.93** 1.72***  1.02***  1.26*** 
 (0.36)  (0.33)  (0.33)  (0.37)  (0.39)  (0.27)  (0.28) 
Elevation      1.09  0.93  0.66  0.15  1.61**  2.71*** 
   (0.81)  (0.79)  (0.84)  (0.65)  (0.75)  (0.79) 
Max difference in elevation     0.58*  0.52*  0.93***  0.81***  0.70***  0.47* 
   (0.33)  (0.30)  (0.27)  (0.28)  (0.25)  (0.25) 
Intersection of Roman roads    0.97***  0.89***  1.03***  0.25  0.59**  0.72** 
   (0.33)  (0.32)  (0.38)  (0.64)  (0.26)  (0.30) 
On the coast     -0.15  -0.16  -0.35  0.01  0.34  0.22 
   (0.43)  (0.37)  (0.33)  (0.34)  (0.29)  (0.30) 
More than 5km from coast    -0.77**  -0.67**  -0.31  -0.01  -0.03  -1.04*** 
   (0.34)  (0.29)  (0.27)  (0.22)  (0.26)  (0.39) 
Population (million people)    -4.11**  -5.35***  -33.26*  -49.26***  -8.04***  -5.44*** 
   (1.89)  (1.80)  (18.42)  (12.46)  (1.36)  (1.53) 
Population squared    1.98  2.05  351.79**  242.18***  3.78***  2.46** 
   (1.43)  (1.39)  (163.69)  (86.97)  (1.07)  (1.15) 
Gini inequality index of  
Land ownership 
   2.12**  0.38  0.11  2.75***  1.19 
     (1.03)  (0.85)  (0.80)  (0.82)  (0.98) 
Gini income inequality index      14.63***  12.98**  13.83***  -4.27  12.69*** 
     (4.91)  (5.19)  (5.11)  (5.01)  (4.31) 
Income per capita            0.51***   
           (0.06)   
Observations 400  400  400  381  337  400  400 
R-squared 0.02  0.25  0.30  0.30  0.26  0.48  0.39 
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Panel B . Total sample of cities in the Center-North    













Endow. and area 
dummies 
Commune  0.90***  2.07*** 1.86*** 1.77*** 1.94*** 1.55*** 1.87*** 
  (0.33)  (0.34) (0.32) (0.37) (0.41) (0.28) (0.26) 
Elevation      1.97*** 2.01*** 1.65*** 1.67*** 2.38*** 3.28*** 
    (0.51) (0.50) (0.51) (0.54) (0.45) (0.54) 
Max  difference  in  elevation      1.42*** 1.37*** 1.54*** 1.49*** 1.34*** 1.17*** 
    (0.24) (0.24) (0.21) (0.24) (0.22) (0.23) 
Intersection  of  Roman  roads         - 
          
On the coast    0.39  0.31  0.37  0.81***  0.65***  0.69** 
    (0.34) (0.32) (0.24) (0.23) (0.25) (0.28) 
More than 5km from coast    1.02  1.16*  1.30**  1.42**  1.57**  1.06 
    (0.66) (0.67) (0.65) (0.65) (0.66) (0.68) 
Population (million people)    -3.59  -4.32*  -59.91***  -65.97***  -7.04***  -4.26** 
    (2.72) (2.46) (9.85) (7.72) (1.84) (1.88) 
Population  squared    1.49 1.49 622.26***  475.75***  3.18**  1.84 
    (2.04) (1.82) (110.61)  (80.43)  (1.36) (1.39) 
Gini inequality of  
land ownership index 
    0.65 0.34 0.24 1.24***  -0.00 
      (0.55) (0.38) (0.33) (0.48) (0.46) 
Gini income inequality 
index 
   10.04***  9.68***  7.60***  0.63  9.62*** 
      (2.22) (1.75) (1.50) (2.23) (1.91) 
Income  per  capita        0.35***   
        ( 0 . 0 4 )    
Observations  5,360  5,360 5,360 5,341 5,298 5,360 5,360 
R-squared  0.01  0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.1  0.09   58
Table 4: Effect of communal history on referenda turnout  
The table shows OLS estimates of the effect of having been an independent city on average referenda turnout computed as the fraction of individuals that participated on average in 
three referenda held after WWII; estimates are run on the sample of the largest 400 towns located in the Center-North of Italy. Regressions are weighted using city population. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** significant at less than 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.  

















Commune -1.25  0.87  1.11**  0.20  0.13  1.11**  0.89* 
 (1.08)  (0.55)  (0.56)  (0.61)  (0.70)  (0.56)  (0.44) 
Elevation   -7.60***  -7.70***  -7.38*** -8.85*** -7.44***  -2.93* 
   (1.63)  (1.63)  (1.61)  (2.05)  (1.64)  (1.68) 
Max difference in elevation     -2.46***  -2.81***  -2.88***  -3.02***  -2.72***  -0.82 
   (0.40)  (0.44)  (0.52)  (0.75)  (0.43)  (0.50) 
Intersection of Roman roads    -0.28  0.09  -0.10  -0.52  -0.06  -0.64 
   (0.47)  (0.52)  (0.56)  (1.06)  (0.51)  (0.44) 
On the coast    -3.11***  -3.19***  -3.65*** -5.74*** -2.98*** -1.81*** 
   (0.72)  (0.71)  (0.83)  (1.05)  (0.67)  (0.67) 
More than 5km from coast    0.31  -0.16  -0.35  -0.77  0.12  0.02 
   (0.80)  (0.78)  (0.74)  (0.73)  (0.77)  (0.94) 
Population (million people)    -7.87**  -9.64***  -16.09  8.77  -10.85***  -0.52 
   (3.23)  (3.58)  (25.42)  (24.05)  (3.37)  (2.43) 
Population squared    0.45  2.26  145.56  -230.29  3.01  -4.15** 
   (2.42)  (2.68)  (214.29)  (169.67)  (2.51)  (1.90) 
Gini inequality index of  
land ownership 
   3.06**  5.32***  5.75***  3.39**  1.94 
     (1.50)  (1.89)  (2.15)  (1.54)  (1.87) 
Gini income inequality index      -9.95  -16.70**  -14.70*  -18.28**  -2.57 
     (6.80)  (8.04)  (8.73)  (8.71)  (7.38) 
Income per capita            0.23   
           (0.15)   
Observations  400 400  400  380  337  400  400 
R-squared  0.02 0.54  0.55  0.35  0.41  0.56  0.64 
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Table 5: Effect of communal history on the existence of an organs donation organization  
The table shows OLS estimates of a linear probability model for the effect of having been an independent city on the existence of an organ donation organization (AIDO) in the 
city. Estimates are run on the sample of the largest 400 towns located in the Center-North of Italy. Regressions are weighted using city population. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. *** significant at less than 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 




No large towns 
 
 
No province capitals  History, geog., 
endowment and 
income 
Commune  0.35***  0.24***  0.17** 0.10  0.02 0.16** 
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) 
Elevation    -0.35  -0.32 -0.38* -0.17  -0.19 
    (0.25) (0.23) (0.22) (0.24) (0.23) 
Max difference in elevation within 
city territory 
  -0.21* -0.16*  -0.04 -0.21** -0.10 
    (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
At intersection of Roman roads    -0.07  -0.13  -0.12  -0.23**  -0.19** 
    (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) 
On the coast    -0.19  -0.17  -0.16*  -0.22**  -0.09 
    (0.14) (0.12) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) 
More than 5km from coast    -0.42**  -0.34**  -0.22  -0.21  -0.25 
    (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) 
Population  (million  people)    0.59 0.55 5.44  9.72**  0.31 
    (0.65) (0.56) (3.86) (4.57) (0.56) 
Population squared    -0.41  -0.68*  14.50  -69.80  -0.54 
   (0.47)  (0.37)  (32.49)  (45.76)  (0.38) 
Gini inequality index of  
land ownership 
   0.41  -0.24  -0.44*  0.60* 
      (0.36) (0.22) (0.26) (0.33) 
Gini income inequality index      5.45***  1.70  1.61  2.70* 
      (1.44) (1.18) (1.34) (1.41) 
Income per capita            0.08*** 
        ( 0 . 0 2 )  
Observations  400 400 400 380 336 400 
R-squared  0.14 0.25 0.32 0.33 0.22 0.36   60
Table 6: Robustness  
Panel A shows non-weighted OLS estimates of the effect of having been an independent city on measures of social capital today. Panel B reports regressions of 
the effects of free cities on social capital for a Commune identifier obtained using the free cities in 1300 C.E. (first three columns) and for an identifier obtained 
as the union of the free cities in 1167 C.E.  and in 1300 C.E. (columns 4-6). Estimates are run on the sample of the largest 400 towns located in the Center-North 
of Italy.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** significant at less than 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
 




Non-profit organizations  Referenda turnout  Organ donation 
organizations 
Commune 1.16**  0.29  0.13* 
 (0.32)  (0.57)  (0.07) 
Elevation   1.68*  -8.75***  -0.48*** 
 (0.74)  (1.90)  (0.15) 
Max difference in elevation    0.82**  -4.28***  -0.08 
 (0.23)  (0.58)  (0.05) 
At intersection of Roman roads  0.82*  -0.38  -0.11 
 (0.36)  (0.67)  (0.08) 
On the coast  0.09  -4.80***  -0.18** 
 (0.38)  (0.91)  (0.08) 
More than 5km from the coast  -0.36  -0.84  -0.11 
 (0.23)  (0.83)  (0.15) 
Population (million people)  -4.53  -1.60  3.02*** 
 (2.95)  (5.25)  (0.85) 
Population squared  1.66  -5.08  -2.54*** 
 (2.32)  (4.22)  (0.68) 
Gini inequality index of  
land ownership 
0.00 9.98***  -0.07 
 (0.77)  (2.28)  (0.19) 
Gini income inequality index  11.36**  -4.51  2.70*** 
 (4.37)  (8.33)  (0.94) 
Observations  400 400  400 
R-squared  0.22 0.44  0.23 
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Referenda turnout  Organ donation 
organizations 
Commune: 1300 C.E. definition  1.50***  0.68  0.21**       
 (0.32)  (0.57)  (0.09)       
Commune: combined definition       1.47***  1.08**  0.20*** 
      (0.29)  (0.51)  (0.08) 
Elevation 1.30  -7.83***  -0.40*  0.92  -7.86***  1.30 
 (0.85)  (1.70)  (0.23)  (0.75)  (1.62)  (0.85) 
Max difference in elevation   0.57**  -2.75***  -0.18**  0.55**  -2.76***  0.57** 
 (0.25)  (0.44)  (0.08)  (0.26)  (0.44)  (0.25) 
On the coast  0.79**  0.09  -0.13  0.85***  0.08  0.79** 
 (0.31)  (0.53)  (0.09)  (0.31)  (0.50)  (0.31) 
More than 5km from the coast  -0.17  -3.41***  -0.15  -0.20  -3.33***  -0.17 
 (0.30)  (0.68)  (0.11)  (0.30)  (0.67)  (0.30) 
Intersection of Roman roads  -0.57**  -0.26  -0.32**  -0.51*  -0.12  -0.57** 
 (0.28)  (0.79)  (0.16)  (0.28)  (0.78)  (0.28) 
Population (million people)  -6.63***  -8.60** 0.37  -6.43***  -9.55***  -6.63*** 
 (1.53)  (3.69)  (0.65)  (1.43)  (3.47)  (1.53) 
Population squared  2.89**  1.53  -0.52  2.82**  2.22  2.89** 
 (1.17)  (2.77)  (0.42)  (1.09)  (2.61)  (1.17) 
Gini inequality index of  
Land ownership 
2.27** 2.87*  0.57  2.05**  2.87*  2.27** 
 (0.97)  (1.51)  (0.39)  (1.00)  (1.49)  (0.97) 
Gini income inequality index  13.90***  -8.48  4.85***  13.70***  -9.67  13.90*** 
 (4.61)  (6.97)  (1.19)  (4.57)  (6.73)  (4.61) 
Observations 400  400  400  400  400  400 
R-squared 0.34  0.55  0.31  0.35  0.55  0.31 
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 Table 7: Digging deeper into history  
Panel A shows the second stage results of a two-step Heckman estimates of the effect of the length of independence of free cities on social capital today. The first stage uses an 
indicator for whether the city was the seat of a Bishop and whether it was founded by the Etruscans to achieve identification. The Mill’s ratio is obtained from the first-step probit 
regression. In Panel B we insert an indicator variable for whether the city evolved into an independent Signoria as an additional regressor. In Panel C we decompose the communed 
indicator variable depending on whether the commune was “neutral,” “allied with the Emperor” or “belonging to the Lombard League” in the war for independence against 
Emperor Frederick I (aka Frederick Barbarossa).  Regressions are run on the sample of the largest 400 towns located in the Center-North. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. *** significant at less than 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
 




Non-profit organizations  Referenda turnout  Organ donation 
organizations 
Log of length of independence  0.33**  0. 16 0.0843* 
 (0.16)  (0. 29) (0.0484) 
Elevation   3.71***  -3.66  -0.0002 
 (1.50)  (2.60)  (0.0004) 
Max difference in elevation    -0.23  -1.86**  -0.0002 
 (0.54)  (0.90)  (0.0002) 
Intersection of Roman roads  0.44  -0.51  0.076 
 (0.  42)  (1.20)  (0.2108) 





More than 5km from the coast  0.45  -0.69  -0.0872 
 (0.42)  (0.64)  (0.1177) 
Population (million people)  -7.35**  2.87  0.0005 
 (  3.13)  (5.02)  (0.0009) 





Mill’s Ratio  -1.10  0.59  -0.2247 
 (0.24)  (0.45)  (0.0749) 
Observations 400  400  400 
Uncensored observations  57  57  57 
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Non-profit organizations  Referenda turnout  Organ donation 
organizations 
Commune 0.94***  0.91  0.13* 
 (0.31)  (0.58)  (0.08) 
Signoria 0.71**  0.72  0.18** 
 (0.30)  (0.49)  (0.08) 
Elevation   1.65*  -7.47***  -0.32 
 (0.88)  (1.66)  (0.23) 
Max difference in elevation  0.37  -2.72***  -0.16* 
 (0.33)  (0.44)  (0.09) 
Intersection of Roman roads   0.85***  -0.01  -0.15 
 (0.31)  (0.54)  (0.09) 
On the coast  -0.24  -3.02***  -0.13 
 (0.32)  (0.70)  (0.10) 
More than 5km from the coast  -0.65*  -0.02  -0.31** 
 (0.39)  (0.76)  (0.15) 
Population (million people)  -6.85***  -9.91***  0.40 
 (1.85)  (3.71)  (0.53) 
Population squared  2.90**  2.22  -0.62* 
 (1.39)  (2.80)  (0.35) 
Gini inequality index of  
land ownership 
0.68 2.84*  0.36 
 (0.96)  (1.50)  (0.33) 
Gini income inequality index  16.20***  -9.89  5.30*** 
 (4.21)  (6.95)  (1.29) 
Observations 400  400  400 
R-squared 0.36  0.56  0.33 
   64
Panel C: The role of the Lombard League  
 
 
Non-profit organizations  Referenda turnout  Organ donation 
organizations 
Neutral city  1.23***  1.09  0.19** 
 (0.35)  (0.72)  (0.09) 
Part of the Lombard League  1.45***  1.65**  0.28*** 
 (0.35)  (0.68)  (0.08) 
Allied to Emperor Fredrick I  0.79*  -0.50  -0.10 
 (0.41)  (1.07)  (0.17) 
Elevation   1.05  -7.33***  -0.37* 
 (0.79)  (1.52)  (0.22) 
Max difference in elevation    0.64**  -2.61***  -0.16** 
 (0.27)  (0.46)  (0.08) 
Intersection of Roman roads  0.84***  -0.20  -0.17* 
 (0.31)  (0.47)  (0.09) 
On the coast  -0.16  -3.09***  -0.12 
 (0.30)  (0.68)  (0.11) 
More than 5km from the coast  -0.59**  -0.05  -0.31* 
 (0.29)  (0.72)  (0.16) 
Population (million people)  -5.01***  -5.73  1.14* 
 (1.63)  (3.68)  (0.60) 
Population squared  1.87  -0.41  -1.05*** 
 (1.23)  (2.66)  (0.40) 
Gini inequality index of  land ownership  2.18**  3.00**  0.55 
 (1.02)  (1.49)  (0.36) 
Gini income inequality index  11.80**  -16.77**  3.64*** 
 (4.75)  (6.59)  (1.11) 
Observations  400 400  400 
R-squared  0.33 0.57  0.34   65
Table 8: First stages   
The table shows estimates of a linear probability model for whether the city was a Commune and the first stage estimates of the I.V. regressions reported in Table 
9. Estimates are run on the sample of the largest 400 towns located in the Center-North. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** significant at less 
than 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.   
  Only instruments  Instruments and 
geography 
First stage estimates 
Bishop city  0.74***  0.75***  0.54*** 
 (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
Etruscan city  0.17***  0.14**  0.21*** 
 (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
Elevation     -0.47**  -0.37** 
   (0.22)  (0.18) 
Max difference in elevation     -0.01  0.08 
   (0.07)  (0.05) 
Intersection of  Roman roads    -0.06  -0.15** 
   (0.08)  (0.06) 
On the coast    -0.25**  -0.26*** 
   (0.11)  (0.08) 
More than 5km from the coast    -0.14***  0.03 
   (0.05)  (0.05) 
Population (million people)      1.59*** 
     (0.31) 
Population squared      -1.16*** 
     (0.23) 
Gini inequality index of  land ownership      -0.54** 
     (0.21) 
Gini income inequality index      2.76*** 
     (0.78) 
Observations 400  400  400 
R-squared 0.6  0.64  0.75 
F-test of excluded instruments      65.77 
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments    0.4746 
 
   66
Table 9: Instrumental variable estimates  
The table shows I.V. estimates of the effect of having been an independent city on measures of current social capital.  Instruments used for the estimates are an indicator of whether 
the city was a Bishop city in 1000 C.E. and an indicator of whether the city was founded by the Etruscans. The bottom of the table shows the F-test for the excluded instruments in 
the first stage regression, the partial R-squared of the excluded instruments in the first stage regression and the p-value of the Sargan test for the validity of the excluded instruments. 
Estimates are run on the sample of the largest 400 towns located in the Center-North of Italy. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** significant at less than 1%; ** 









Referenda turnout  Organs donation 
organizations 
Commune: basic definition  1.03**  1.98***  0.42***       
 (0.47)  (0.75)  (0.13)       
Commune: 1300C.E. definition       1.34**  2.43**  0.57*** 
      (0.60)  (1.11)  (0.18) 
Elevation 0.92  -7.27***  -0.32  1.21  -6.76***  -0.17 
 (0.79)  (1.54)  (0.21)  (0.93)  (1.98)  (0.27) 
Max difference in elevation   0.52*  -2.87***  -0.21**  0.57**  -2.78***  -0.19** 
 (0.30)  (0.44)  (0.09)  (0.25)  (0.44)  (0.08) 
Intersection of Roman roads  0.89***  0.03  -0.13  0.81***  -0.09  -0.16* 
 (0.32)  (0.50)  (0.09)  (0.31)  (0.51)  (0.10) 
On the coast  -0.17  -2.89***  -0.06  -0.21  -2.99***  -0.07 
 (0.35)  (0.71)  (0.11)  (0.32)  (0.70)  (0.11) 
More than 5km from the coast  -0.68**  0.03  -0.27*  -0.60**  0.14  -0.24 
 (0.29)  (0.75)  (0.16)  (0.29)  (0.76)  (0.16) 
Population (million people)  -5.31**  -11.85***  -0.15  -6.22***  -13.21***  -0.59 
 (2.14)  (3.59)  (0.79)  (2.05)  (4.10)  (0.80) 
Population squared  2.02  3.75  -0.17  2.61*  4.65  0.12 
 (1.61)  (2.64)  (0.52)  (1.50)  (2.89)  (0.52) 
Gini inequality index of  
land ownership 
2.11** 3.39**  0.66  2.21**  3.50** 0.70* 
 (1.02)  (1.48)  (0.42)  (0.96)  (1.58)  (0.42) 
Gini income inequality index  14.68***  -12.45*  4.18***  14.28***  -12.96*  3.92*** 
 (4.99)  (6.56)  (1.21)  (4.90)  (6.68)  (1.22) 
Observations 400  400  400 400  400  400 
F-test of excluded instruments  65.77  65.77  65.77 18.99  18.99  18.99 
Sargan test: p-value 0.1507  0.0083  0.9928 0.11198  0.0072  0.7621   67
 
Table 10: Predicting probability that a city is independent   
Panel A shows probit estimates of the probability that a city in the Center-North becomes an independent city; it uses characteristics of the city at the time the 
Communes were formed. Regressions  are run on the sample of the largest 400 towns located in the Center-North of Italy. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses.  *** significant at less than 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.  Panel B shows the distribution of the predicted probabilities using the 
estimates in Table 1 for the sample of towns in the Center-North of Italy. Panel C does the same, but for the sample of cities located in the South using the 
parameter estimates in Panel A.    
Panel A. Probability city in Center-North of Italy is independent.         
    
Bishop city  1.88*** 
                                   (0.26) 
Founded by the Etruscans  0.68* 
                                   (0.35) 
Elevation -0.12 
                                   (0.85) 
Max difference in elevation   0.03 
                                   (0.24) 
On the coast  -0.78* 
                                   (0.42) 
City population above 10k people (1300 C.E.)  2.30*** 
                                   (0.48) 
City population between 1K-10K people (1300 C.E.)  1.12*** 
                                   (0.36) 
Observations 400 
   
Pseudo R-squared        0.61 
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Panel B. Distribution of predicted probabilities in the Center-North of Italy 
Percentile  Total sample  Among cities that actually 
became independent 
Among cities that did not 
become independent 
1% 0.0012  0.0104  0.0012 
5% 0.0052  0.012  0.0013 
10% 0.0111  0.1289  0.01067 
25% 0.0116  0.3503  0.0125 
50% 0.0121  0.8803  0.01251 
75% 0.1145  0.9948  0.1254 
90% 0.6149  0.9953  0.1281 
95% 0.9727  0.9954  0.3529 
99% 0.9954  0.9959  0.6122 
Mean 0.1480  0.6887  0.054 
St. Dev.  0.2841  0.3465  0.1199 
# of cities  400  61  339 
Panel C. Distribution of predicted probabilities in the South of Italy 
Percentile  Total sample  Potentially independent city  Potentially non-independent city 
1% 0.0011  0.352  0.0011 
5% 0.0012  0.3523  0.0012 
10% 0.0012  0.3539  0.0012 
25% 0.011  0.3612  0.0103 
50% 0.012  0.5  0.012 
75% 0.1218  0.874  0.028 
90% 0.3534  0.8796  0.1251 
95% 0.5098  0.8804  0.3266 
99% 0.8797  0.9725  0.3471 
Mean 0.1055  0.5866  0.0471 
St. Dev.  0.1981  0.2136  0.0836 
# of cities  286  31  255 
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Table 11: Difference in difference estimates   
Panel A shows mean values of the level of social capital (number of non-profit organizations, referenda turnout, organ donation organizations ) for independent 
and non-independent cities in Italy’s Center-North and for predicted independent and predicted non-independent cities in the South and the differences in means. 
Panel B shows controlled regression estimates of the effects of independence on social capital in the two areas. Panel C shows the difference in difference 
estimates where the predicted commune in the South are obtained using the Abadie and Imbens (2002) matching technique rather than the probit model. Robust 
standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** significant at less than 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.  
 
Panel A. Differences in social capital between Center-North and South and between independent and non-independent cities  
 Non  profit  organizations 
 
Referenda turnout  Organ donation organizations 
 North  South  Diff North  South  Diff  North  South  Diff 
                
Commune 6.21  3.48  2.73***  86.92  69.60  17.32***  0.72  0.35  0.37*** 
                          (0.356)          (1.33)          (0.10) 
                
Non- commune  5.11  3.13  1.98***  86.65  67.77   18.88***  0.34  0.26  0.08** 
                                 (0.135)                        (0.75)                            (0.04) 
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Panel B. Effect of free cities and on social capital in the Center-North and in the South 
 









Potential  Commune  0.35 0.45 2.04 -0.03 0.09 -0.03 
  (0.27) (0.27) (1.41) (1.44) (0.09) (0.08) 
(Potential  Commune)×North  0.75** 0.83**  -1.65  -1.94 0.29*** 0.18* 
  (0.37) (0.36) (1.52) (1.55) (0.11) (0.10) 
South  dummy  -1.98*** -2.11***  -19.09***  -16.95*** -0.08**  -0.07** 
  (0.13) (0.15) (0.77) (0.81) (0.04) (0.04) 
Elevation   -0.35***  -9.20***   0.04** 
   (0.06)  (1.97)  (0.02) 
Max difference in elevation    0.20    -2.60***    -0.15*** 
   (0.14)  (0.58)  (0.03) 
On the coast    0.13    -4.45***    -0.08* 
   (0.19)  (0.95)  (0.05) 
More than 5km from the coast    -0.24    1.87    -0.06 
   (0.29)  (1.83)  (0.10) 
Population (million people)    -1.05    24.52***    2.66*** 
   (1.96)  (8.17)  (0.58) 
Populations squared    -0.84    -27.73***    -2.22*** 
   (1.58)  (7.30)  (0.50) 
Gini income inequality index     6.80**    25.13*    2.51*** 
   (3.09)   (14.87)   (0.65) 
Gini inequality index of  
land ownership   
 0.40   5.06*    0.40*** 
   (0.54)  (2.60)  (0.14) 
Observations 686  686  686  686  686  686 
R-squared  0.28 0.38 0.57 0.65 0.07 0.23 
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Panel C. As above but using Abadie and Imbens (2002) matching procedure   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




Referenda turnout  Referenda turnout  Organs donation  Organs donation 
Potential free city (matched)  0.06  0.25  2.19  0.70  0.08  -0.05 
  (0.26) (0.25) (1.72) (1.74) (0.09) (0.08) 
(Potential  free  city)×North  1.03***  1.00***  -1.80 -2.62 0.30***  0.19** 
  (0.36) (0.35) (1.81) (1.79) (0.11) (0.09) 
South  dummy  -1.94***  -2.09***  -19.09*** -17.03*** -0.08**  -0.07** 
  (0.14) (0.15) (0.76) (0.79) (0.04) (0.04) 
Elevation  -0.35***   -9.09***   0.04** 
   (0.06)    (1.97)    (0.02) 
Max difference in elevation    0.20    -2.62***    -0.15*** 
   (0.14)    (0.58)    (0.03) 
On the coast    0.13    -4.43***    -0.08 
   (0.19)    (0.94)    (0.05) 
More than 5km from the coast    -0.23    1.92    -0.06 
   (0.29)    (1.83)    (0.10) 
Population (million people)    -0.64    23.86***    2.65*** 
   (1.93)    (8.15)    (0.59) 
Populations squared    -1.13    -27.37***    -2.22*** 
   (1.57)    (7.34)    (0.50) 
Gini income inequality index     6.73**    25.23*    2.52*** 
   (3.09)    (14.81)    (0.65) 
Gini inequality index of  
land ownership   
 0.39   5.11**   0.40*** 
   (0.55)    (2.60)    (0.14) 
Observations 686  686  686  686  686  686 
R-squared  0.28 0.38 0.57 0.65 0.06 0.23 
   72
 
Table 12: Validating the instruments  
Panel A shows reduced form regressions of social capital in the South (first three columns) and in the North (last three columns); Panel B reports reduced form and I.V.  estimates on social capital in the 
North sample controlling for cities that became seat of a bishop after 1400 C.E.. In Panel A, columns (1) and (6) and in Panel B columns (1)-(3) social capital is measured with the number of non-profit 
organizations per 1000 inhabitants.  Columns (2) and (5) of panel A and  (4)-(6) of Panel B  measure the referenda turnout and columns (3) and (6) of Panel A and  (7)-(9) of Panel B  with the existence 
of an organ donation organizations.  Late Bishop city is equal to 1 if a Bishop city was created after 1400 C.E. and zero otherwise.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** significant at less than 1%; 
** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
A. Reduced form regressions of social capital in the South and in the North 

















Bishop city  0.44  1.89  0.15  0.64**  0.16  0.17** 
 (0.33)  (1.54)  (0.10)  (0.31)  (0.44)  (0.07) 
Etruscan city   -0.80**  -0.24  -0.21  0.49**  1.87***  0.10 
 (0.33)  (3.31)  (0.16)  (0.25)  (0.52)  (0.07) 
Elevation -0.38**  -0.88  -0.37*  0.34  -7.47***  -0.37* 
 (0.17)  (0.63)  (0.21)  (0.81)  (1.50)  (0.22) 
Max difference in elevation   -0.23  -2.43**  -0.27***  0.79***  -2.47***  -0.21** 
 (0.18)  (1.18)  (0.06)  (0.30)  (0.43)  (0.09) 
On the coast  0.10  -2.34  -0.13  -0.40  -3.26***  -0.16 
 (0.30)  (1.59)  (0.09)  (0.34)  (0.65)  (0.12) 
More than 5km from coast  -0.05  3.47  -0.01  -0.44  0.23  -0.30* 
 (0.58)  (3.34)  (0.12)  (0.27)  (0.79)  (0.16) 
Population (million people)  1.40  12.98  -1.27  -2.59*  -8.39***  0.24 
 (2.59)  (15.10)  (1.05)  (1.50)  (2.77)  (0.69) 
Populations squared  -2.63  -18.44  1.59  -0.20  1.96  -0.36 
 (2.49)  (13.22)  (1.02)  (1.13)  (2.08)  (0.46) 
Gini income inequality index   5.74  55.75*  4.42**  0.81  1.71  0.57 
 (4.51)  (28.51)  (1.85)  (1.04)  (1.42)  (0.38) 
Gini inequality index of  
land ownership   
1.25 -2.82  1.32***  19.85***  -7.23  4.68*** 
 (0.82)  (5.88)  (0.29)  (4.83)  (6.51)  (1.13) 
Observations 286  286  286  400  400  400 
-test for both instruments = 0  
(p-value)  
0.0434 0.4680  0.1672  0.0113 0.0006 0.0164 
R-squared 0.19  0.09    0.26  0.57  0.13   73
 
B.  Reduced form and IV regressions in the North controlling for cities that became a seat for the bishop after 1400 C.E. 
 Non-profit  organizations  Referenda  turnout Organ  donation  organizations 
  (2)  (3)  (5)  (6) (8) (9) 
  Reduced form  I.V.  Reduced form  I.V. Reduced  form I.V. 
Seat of a bishop in 1000 C.E.  0.78**   0.08   0.20**   
  (0.34)    (0.46)   (0.08)  
Etruscan city   0.43*   1.89***   0.09  
  (0.26)    (0.53)   (0.07)  
New seat of a bishop (after 1400 C.E.)  0.73 0.83 -0.34  -0.19  0.13 0.07 
  (0.54)  (0.51)  (0.69)  (0.74) (0.11) (0.11) 
Commune   1.18**   1.94***    0.42*** 
   (0.50)    (0.71)  (0.12) 
Elevation  0.26 0.92  -7.48***  -7.27***  -0.37*  -0.33 
  (0.80)  (0.76)  (1.52)  (1.58) (0.22) (0.22) 
Max difference in elevation   0.79** 0.52*  -2.46***  -2.87***  -0.21**  -0.20** 
  (0.31)  (0.30)  (0.43)  (0.44) (0.09) (0.09) 
Intersection of Roman roads  0.89***  0.96***  -0.02  0.02  -0.18**  -0.13 
 (0.31)  (0.33)  (0.57)  (0.52)  (0.09)  (0.10) 
On the coast  -0.46 -0.20  -3.24***  -2.89***  -0.17  -0.07 
  (0.36)  (0.36)  (0.65)  (0.72) (0.12) (0.12) 
More than 5km from the sea  -0.39 -0.63**  0.20  0.02  -0.29* -0.27* 
  (0.27)  (0.29)  (0.79)  (0.75) (0.17) (0.16) 
Population (million people)  -2.54* -5.51**  -8.38***  -11.80***  0.24  -0.15 
  (1.52)  (2.21)  (2.78)  (3.59) (0.69) (0.78) 
Population squared  -0.21 2.25  1.93  3.70  -0.35  -0.16 
  (1.15)  (1.67)  (2.08)  (2.65) (0.46) (0.51) 
Gini land inequality index  0.68 2.02*  1.81 3.42**  0.53 0.66 
  (1.05)  (1.04)  (1.42)  (1.50) (0.38) (0.43) 
Gini income inequality index  19.05*** 13.29***  -6.75  -12.12*  4.50***  4.11*** 
  (4.84)  (4.96)  (6.58)  (6.59) (1.13) (1.24) 
Observations 400  400  400  400  400  400 
R-squared 0.27    0.57    0.31     74
 
Table 13: Effect of social capital on income per capita    
The table shows estimates of the effect of social capital on per capita income in the city. Social capital is measured with the number of non-profit organizations per 1000 inhabitants.  The first two 
columns show OLS estimates; the remaining columns show I.V. regressions. In columns (3), (4) and (5) the instrument is the indicator for Commune; in column (6) the instrument is the log of the length 
of independence (the variable is zero if the city was not independent). In column (7) the instruments are: an indicator of whether the city was a Bishop city in 1000 C.E.  and  an indicator of whether the 
city was founded by the Etruscans. The last row shows the F-test for the excluded instruments in the first stage regression, and the p-value of the Sargan test for the validity of the excluded instruments. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *** significant at less than 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 







of indip  
I.V.: Bishop + 
Etruscan city 
Social  capital    0.40*** 0.38*** 0.57*** 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.57***  0.81*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.13) (0.19) (0.21) (0.22)  (0.30) 
Elevation  -0.72 -0.69  -1.02*  -1.00 -1.01 -1.08* -1.32* 
  (0.62) (0.62) (0.61) (0.65) (0.64) (0.65)  (0.74) 
Max  difference  in  elevation    -0.48** -0.48** -0.45** -0.45** -0.46** -0.49**  -0.41* 
  (0.22) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21)  (0.23) 
On  the  coast  -0.11 -0.16 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03  0.26 
  (0.32) (0.32) (0.31) (0.33) (0.40) (0.41)  (0.50) 
More than 5km from the coast  -0.03  -0.05  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.11  0.19 
  (0.47) (0.47) (0.44) (0.45) (0.45) (0.47)  (0.51) 
Intersection  of  Roman  roads  0.04 -0.01 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.11  -0.34 
  (0.24) (0.24) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)  (0.33) 
Population  (million  people)  13.61*** 11.05*** 13.15*** 12.77*** 12.73*** 12.44***  15.13*** 
  (1.85) (2.35) (1.75) (2.77) (2.91) (2.95)  (3.69) 
Population  squared  -9.03*** -7.20*** -8.61*** -8.34*** -8.31*** -8.03***  -9.90*** 
  (1.79) (2.06) (1.68) (2.22) (2.29) (2.31)  (2.81) 
Gini inequality index of  land ownership  -0.26 -0.18 -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 -0.30  -0.06 
  (0.70) (0.70) (0.66) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65)  (0.73) 
# of visitors per million people       0.00  0.00  -0.01 
       (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Province  dummies  YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES 
Province  capital  dummies  NO YES NO YES  YES YES  YES 
Observations 400  400  400  400  400  383 400 
Sargan test (p-value)         0.9763 
F-test for excluded instrument      29.68  15.77 13.54  11.18 3.95 
R-squared  0.74  0.74          75
Table 14. Effect of social capital (number of non-profit organizations per capita) on total wealth per capita  
The table shows estimates of the effect of social capital on gross per capita household wealth, measured as the sum of house equity value and bank deposits. Social capital is measured with the number 
of non-profit organizations per 1000 inhabitants. The first two columns show OLS estimates; the remaining columns show I.V. regressions. In columns (3), (4) and (5) the instrument is the indicator for 
Commune; in column (6) the instrument is the log of the length of independence (the variable is zero if the city was not independent). In columns (7) the instruments are: an indicator of whether the city 
was a Bishop city in 1000 C.E. and an indicator of whether the city was founded by the Etruscans. The last row shows the F-test for the excluded instruments in the first stage regression and the p-value 
of the Sargan test for the validity of the excluded instruments. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at less than 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 












Social  capital    2.14*** 1.98*** 3.92*** 4.26*** 3.09**  2.31  3.90* 
 (0.32)  (0.34)  (1.04)  (1.51)  (1.49)  (1.56)  (2.01) 
Elevation -1.45  -1.27  -4.54  -5.06  -8.61*  -7.82*  -9.63* 
 (4.75)  (4.75)  (4.81)  (5.18)  (4.63)  (4.61)  (5.07) 
Max difference in elevation    -3.84**  -3.84**  -3.52** -3.49**  -4.22***  -4.46***  -4.06*** 
 (1.67)  (1.67)  (1.59)  (1.62)  (1.49)  (1.49)  (1.57) 
On the coast  12.62***  12.37***  13.76***  14.11***  7.53**  6.18**  8.49** 
 (2.45)  (2.45)  (2.40)  (2.61)  (2.93)  (2.95)  (3.40) 
More than 5km from the coast  0.00  -0.08  1.04  1.23  0.77  2.18  1.22 
 (3.62)  (3.62)  (3.47)  (3.58)  (3.28)  (3.33)  (3.48) 
Intersection of Roman roads  3.92**  3.66*  1.96  1.95  2.95  3.74*  2.34 
 (1.87)  (1.88)  (2.08)  (2.12)  (1.99)  (1.95)  (2.28) 
Population (million people)  58.17***  43.77**  53.32***  64.89***  49.50**  37.42*  57.30** 
  (14.19) (17.99) (13.67) (22.07) (21.16) (21.03)  (25.20) 
Population  squared  -13.37  -3.06 -8.88  -17.04  -6.94 1.95 -12.09 
  (13.68) (15.80) (13.16) (17.69) (16.70) (16.45)  (19.16) 
Gini inequality index of  land ownership  0.17  0.64  1.55  1.32  1.87  -0.41  2.06 
 (5.40)  (5.40)  (5.16)  (5.21)  (4.75)  (4.67)  (4.95) 
# of visitors per million people          0.32***  0.34***  0.30*** 
         (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.07) 
Province dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Province capital dummies  NO  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Observations 400  400  400 400  400  383 400 
Sargan test (p-value)             0.3079 
F-test for excluded instrument  -  -  29.68  15.77  13.54  11.18  3.95 
R-squared 0.70  0.70           
 